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PUNISHING CHILDREN IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
Cynthia V. Ward* 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the facts in this attempted murder case, which Califor-
nia prosecutors filed in 1996: 
Defendant told a witness that the victim's family "looked at him 
wrong," and that in return he, Defendant, "had to kill the baby."1 De-
fendant and two acquaintances then went to the victim's apartment 
when the victim's parents were out grocery shopping and had left 
their infant son with his eighteen-year-old stepsister, who was in the 
bathroom and did not hear Defendant and his friends enter the 
house.2 Defendant went to the baby's bedroom, took the baby, four-
week-old Ignacio Bermudez, out of his bassinet, dropped him on the 
floor, and proceeded to beat the infant in the head with his fists, feet, 
and a stick. Defendant and his accomplices then stole property from 
the house and departed. Mter the assault, Defendant threatened a 
female witness with harm if she reported the incident. Defendant 
then told a family member about the attack; the family member re-
ported him to the authorities. Questioned about the attack, Defen-
dant first lied about it, then eventually re-enacted the assault in a 
videotaped interview with police.3 
Doctors determined that Ignacio Bermudez had suffered "global" 
brain damage from the attack. 4 Eighteen months after the assault, the 
baby was unable to see, walk, or make intelligible sounds.5 According 
to a media report at the time, "Doctors say nothing less than a miracle 
© 2006 Cynthia V. Ward. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce 
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational 
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre 
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice. 
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. 
1 Greg Beck, Suspected Baby-Beating Child To Stay in Custody, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 
27, 1996, at Al (quoting prosecutor Harold Jewett). 
2 !d. 
3 !d. 
4 !d. 
5 Id. 
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will restore Ignacio to health."6 California prosecutors described De-
fendant as the "ringleader" in the attack and charged him with at-
tempted murder.7 The defense did not dispute the essential facts. 8 
Is Defendant guilty? 
Now consider one additional fact: at the time of his assault on 
Ignacio Bermudez, Defendant was six years old.9 Should the single 
circumstance of age make a difference to Defendant's guilt or 
punishment? 
For most of the twentieth century the law's answer was "yes." Pre-
adolescent offenders, even violent ones, were routinely found not re-
sponsible and were instead routed through the non-punitive juvenile 
system, which emphasized treatment and rehabilitation over blame. 
But the "youth excuse" has come under strong attack in response to 
high levels of public concern over the violent and harmful actions of 
young defendants.10 Over the past two decades the states have signifi-
cantly revamped their criminal codes to make it easier to punish chil-
dren who commit violent offenses. 11 The fact that a six-year-old was 
6 Mary Curti us, Life of Tears and Hope for Beaten Baby's Family, L.A TIMES, Nov. 2, 
1997, at Al. 
7 ld. 
8 !d. 
9 !d. Because of his juvenile status, Defendant's full name was not used in the 
media, which referred to him only as "Brandon T." 
10 For example, in a television interview, former California Governor Pete Wilson 
explained: "We cannot ignore the fact that there are kids ... who are committing 
violent adult felonies, and we cannot tolerate it. And youth is no excuse for commit-
ting murder, robbery, rape, home invasions, or for terrorizing entire neighborhoods." 
NewsHour with jim Lehrer: Juvenile Justice (PBS television broadcast Feb. 29, 2000), avail-
able at http:/ /www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/youth/janjune00/justice_2-29.html. Con-
trary to the impression one sometimes receives from scholarship in the field, this view 
has been recently expressed not only in the United States but also in Europe. See, e.g., 
Home Office, No More Excuses: A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in En-
gland and Wales (Nov. 30, 1997), http:/ /www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/jou-no-
more-excuses?wiel==html. ("An excuse culture has developed within the youth justice 
system. It excuses itself for its inefficiency, and too often excuses the young offenders 
before it, implying that they cannot help their behaviour because of their social cir-
cumstances .... The system allows them to go on wrecking their own lives as well as 
disrupting their families and communities."). 
ll See, e.g., RkhardJ. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youth-
ful Offenders, in YouTH ON TRIAL 73, 84 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 
2000) ("Alarmed by an increase in violent offenses (especially gun homicides) by 
juveniles, most states during the past decade revised their codes pertaining to the 
adjudication of youths charged with serious and violent offenses."); CarrieS. Fried & 
N. Dickon Reppucci, Criminal Decision Making: The Development of Adolescent Judgment, 
Criminal Responsibility, and Culpability, 25 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 45, 45-46 (2001) ("The 
1980s and 1990s were characterized by increasingly adult-like treatment of juveniles in 
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actually charged with attempted murder12 reflects the change in atti-
tude that underlies this trend: twenty years ago even the most serious 
cases involving children under seven were adjudicated in juvenile 
court, and in a non-punitive fashion. 13 The law has changed dramati-
cally, to the point where some states now allow judicial waiver of chil-
dren into adult court at any age, at least when the child is charged 
with a serious offense. 14 And in a small but growing number of cases, 
adult-sized punishment is in fact being inflicted-even when it in-
volves a sentence of life without parole. 15 
The issue of punishing children for crime has exposed a divide 
between the political actors who design and enforce the law, and 
the coun system and increased focus on the protection of the community rather than 
the protection of the juvenile defendant. Between 1992 and 1995, forty-one states 
enacted laws making it easier to prosecute juveniles in adult criminal court. Other 
legislative mechanisms that emphasize punishment over rehabilitation of juveniles in-
clude minimum sentencing requirements, blended sentencing that allows juveniles to 
be sentenced past the age of twenty one years, and revision of confidentiality provi-
sions in favor of more open proceedings and records." (citing MELISSA S1CKMUND ET 
AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE jUSTICE., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIGfiMS (1997))). 
12 The court in the case dropped the charge to assault with intent to do bodily 
harm, before eventually deciding that the defendant, known in public only as Bran-
don T., was not competent to stand trial. Frontline: Little Criminals (PBS television 
broadcast May 13, 1997), available at http:/ /www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/little/etc/script.html; see infra Part I.A.2.b. 
13 See, e.g., Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredatvr Myth: "Why Infancy Is 
the Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 7 5 N.Y. U. L. REv. 159, 1 73-80 ( 2000) 
(recounting the history of infancy defense in juvenile court). 
14 See, e.g., Lisa Beresford, Note, Is Lowering the Age at "Which juveniles Can Be 
Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment, 
37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 783, 800 n.l35 (2000) (citing as examples the states of Alaska, 
Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, 
Rhode Island, and South Carolina). 
15 See, e.g., LYNN CoTHERN, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, CooRDINATING CouNCIL oN 
jUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 10 (2000), available at http:/ /V..'WW. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/184748.pdf ("The justice system's recent shift toward 
stronger punishment policies has been marked not only by increased use of the death 
penalty but by increases in the number of offenders-including juveniles who com-
mitted offenses prior to their 18th birthdays-being sentenced to life in prison with-
out the possibility of parole .... The overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions 
allow life without parole for offenders younger than age 16. Some even make it 
mandatory for defendants convicted of certain offenses in criminal court. In Wash-
ington State, offenders as young as 8 can be sentenced to life. In Vermont, 10-year-
olds can face the sentence." (footnotes omitted)). ln Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
574 (2005), of course, the United States Supreme Court held that defendants who 
were under age eighteen at the time of their crimes may not be sentenced to death. 
See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
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those in the academy who evaluate its justification and effect. 16 The 
law itself has moved strongly and consistently ir:t the direction of con-
victing and punishing juveniles who commit violent offenses. Politi-
cians speak loudly in favor of "send[ing] a message to violent 
criminals of all ages"17 and of" 'putting these juvenile criminals where 
they need to be-behind bars in the adult prisons.' "18 Although legis-
lators often cite the values of deterrence and public protection as rea-
sons for the punitive turn toward juveniles,19 the angry tone of the 
debate also signals the presence of a strong retributive impulse.20 
16 See, e.g., David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and juvenile Transfer: 
How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEx. L. REv. 1555, 1569-73 (2004); 
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEx. L. REv. 799, 829-39 
(2003); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & PoL'v 
REv. 143, 158-73 (2003). 
17 John Caher, Rhetoric and Reality in the Pataki Era, TIMES UNION (Albany), Jan. 
18, 1998, at A6 (quoting New York Governor George Pataki); see also Michael Finne-
gan, Governor Urges Hard Hits on Young Criminals, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Dec. 10, 1995, at 8 
(quoting Governor Pataki's statement: "It's time we take that same tough approach to 
juvenile crime that we take to violent crime in general."). 
18 Mark Hollis, House Weighs Treating 16-, 17-year-olds as Adults, S. FLA. SuN-SENTI-
NEL, Mar. 30, 2000, at lB. (quoting Sandy Murman, Florida State Representative); see 
also David Judson, Juvenile Crime Legislation Expanded, Not Stiffened, GANNETT NEws SER-
VICE, Oct. 21, 1998 ("The main initiative to fail amid the last-minute horse-trading [in 
the U.S. Congress] was a proposal sponsored chiefly by Rep. Bill McCollum, R.-Fla., 
and Sen. Orrin Hatch, R.-Utah, that would have provided states as much as $2.5 bil-
lion over five years to crack down on juvenile crime, add judges and build new youth 
lockups. The price of the aid, however, required states to adopt rules encouraging 
prosecutors to try more juveniles as adults, and in cases of particularly heinous crimes, 
seek the death penalty for offenders as young as 15."). 
19 For example, Florida state senator Gary Siegel, R.-Longwood, who favored pas-
sage of a new bill that "cracks down" on juvenile crime, was quoted as saying: 
'juveniles all over the state are aware of what we're doing and they want to see how 
we're going to address this epidemic increase in crime. They are waiting for our 
signal." Curtis Krueger, Senate Passes juvenile Crime Bill Unanimously, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994, at 4B; see also Caher, supra note 17 ("'Let's send a message to 
violent criminals of all ages: If you assault our people, you will land in prison.'" (quot-
ing George E. Pataki, New York Governor)). 
20 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 807. Scott and Steinberg explain 
that the trend toward punishing juveniles criminally "has features of moral panic" and 
that "the elements of a moral panic include an intense community concern (often 
triggered by a publicized incident) that is focused on deviant behavior, an exagger-
ated perception of the seriousness of the threat and the number of offenders, and 
collective hostility toward the offenders, who are perceived as outsiders threatening 
the community. !d.; see also Bazelon, supra note 13, at 179 ("The current wave of 
crime reform is characterized by the sentiment that the punishment should fit the 
crime, not the criminal. This just deserts' approach is designed to 'crack[ ] down 
especially hard on juvenile offenders,' whom many believe 'are now coddled by a 
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But the punitive turn toward young offenders conflicts head-on 
with the received view of legal scholars that important differences be-
tween children and adults-and even between older adolescents and 
adults-mandate separate, and gentler, treatment of juveniles who 
commit serious crimes.21 
Considerable irony attends this debate. In the 1970s and 1980s, a 
vocal "Children's Rights" movement argued passionately for the pro-
position that adolescents were as competent as adults to make many 
important life decisions, including the decisions to drink alcohol, to 
consent to medical treatment, and to have an abortion without con-
sulting a parent.22 Accompanying this movement were behavioral 
studies purporting to discover that, in important and legally relevant 
respects, the cognitive capacities of adolescents equal those of 
adults23 : 
Contrary to the stereotype of adolescents as markedly egocentric, 
for example, or as handicapped by deficiencies in logical ability, 
studies show that adolescents (at least, from age fifteen on) are no 
more likely than adults to suffer from the "personal fable" (the be-
lief that one's behavior is somehow not governed by the same rules 
justice system that clings to a discredited belief in rehabilitation."' (quoting ELLIOT 
CuRRIE, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICA 4 ( 1998))). 
21 See, e.g., Brink, supra note 16, at 1557 ("For a variety of reasons, juveniles tend 
to be less competent in discriminating right from wrong and in being able to regulate 
successfully their actions in accord with these discriminations. If they are less compe-
tent, then [on a retributive theory of punishment] they are less responsible. But then 
the trend to try juveniles as adults mistakenly assesses the punishment juveniles de-
serve by the wrong or harm they have done, ignoring their diminished responsibility 
for this wrong or harm."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 801 ("Using the tools of 
developmental psychology, we examine two important dimensions of adolescence 
that distinguish this group from adults in ways that are important to criminal culpabil-
ity. Because these developmental factors influence their criminal choices, young 
wrongdoers are less blameworthy than adults under conventional criminal law con-
ceptions of mitigation."); Bazelon, supra note 13, at 163 ("Only by retaining the dis-
tinctions between the mental capacities of pre teenage children on the one hand, and 
adolescents, or fully mature adults on the other, can juvenile courts ensure that the 
sanctions imposed are consistent with fundamental notions of fairness and due pro-
cess.); see also Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 11, at 93-98 (arguing on grounds both of 
competence and culpability that children and adolescents should not be held as re-
sponsible as adults who commit facially similar offenses). 
22 See Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile justice Counterreuolution: Responding to Cogni-
tive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY LJ. 
65, 91-92 (1999). 
23 Young children-those under the age of ten-were generally excepted from 
these findings; with respect to them, it was generally conceded that cognitive differ-
ences did justify different treatment from that accorded to adults. See, e.g., Brink, 
supra note 16, at 1570; Bazelon, supra note 13, at 163. 
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of nature that apply to everyone else, as when a cigarette smoker 
believes that he is immune to the health effects of smoking) and no 
less likely than adults to employ rational algorithms in decision-
making situations. In fact, there is substantial evidence that adoles-
cents are well aware of the risks they take .... 2 4 
The authors go on to note that "[t]hese findings about a relative 
lack of differences between adolescents and adults were used by youth 
advocates in the 1 980s to argue for the expansion of the rights af-
forded to minors. In particular, independent access to abortion was 
at the center of a vigorous moral, political, and legal debate."25 
Based in large part on the lack of differences found in the in-
formed consent literature, a number of psychologists supported the 
adolescent autonomy position.26 In its amicus brief in the Supreme 
Court case of Hodgson v. Minnesota,27 for example, the American Psy-
chological Association (APA) cited abundant studies supporting the 
claim that juveniles possess sufficient maturity to decide, without adult 
consultation, whether or not to have an abortion.28 "[B]y middle ado-
lescence (age 14-15)," the APA report concluded, "young people de-
velop abilities similar to adults in reasoning about moral dilemmas, 
understanding social rules and laws, [and] reasoning about interper-
sonal relationships and interpersonal problems .... "29 
When, in the 1 990s, such research formed the basis for the argu-
ment that adolescents ought not only to be accorded rights, but also 
24 Elizabeth Cauffman et a!., justice Jar juveniles: New PfJTspectives on Adolescents' Com-
petence and Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 403, 407 (1999) (citing Marilyn Jacobs-
Quadrel eta!., Adolescent (ln)vulnfJTability, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 102 (1993)). 
25 /d. at 408. 
26 Jd. at 408-09; see also Fried & Reppucci, supra note 11, at 46 ("Adolescent deci-
sion making has been studied in several legally relevant contexiS, including compe-
tence to make abortion decisions, consent to medical treatment and waiver of 
Miranda righiS. In general, these studies have found that, past the age of 14 years, 
adolescents are competent decision makers under the informed-consent model as 
long as they are of average or above-average intelligence." (citations omitted) (citing 
THOMAS GRisso, jUVENILES' WAIVER oF RIGHTS (1981); Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rap-
paport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent 
toAbmtion, 16 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 129 (1992); Louis A. Weithorn, Children's Capacities in 
Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAw (N. Dickon Reppucci eta!. 
eds., 1984))). 
27 497 U.S. 417,457-58 (1990) (striking down state law requiring that minor fe-
males notify both pareniS and then wait forty-eight hours before having an abortion as 
unconstitutional because it was not reasonably related to legitimate state interesiS). 
28 Brief for American Psychological Association et a!. as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 18-20, Hodson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) 
(Nos. 88-1125 & 88-1309). 
29 /d. at 19 (footnotes omitted). 
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assigned responsibility (including criminal responsibility) for their be-
havior, the children's movement found that studies demonstrating the 
substantially equal capacities of adolescents and adults 
proved to be a double-edged sword. How could adolescents be ma-
ture enough to make their own decisions about abortion, but not 
mature enough to face the consequences of committing armed rob-
bery or using marijuana? The very existence of a separate justice 
system for juveniles is predicated in part on the assumption that the 
basic competencies of adolescents and adults differ in fundamental 
ways that affect judgment. If adolescents and adults are equally ca-
pable decision-makers, the argument that adolescents suffer from 
"diminished responsibility" is called into question. Indeed, the very 
same evidence that had been used to advocate for young people's 
autonomy in medical decision-making could provide-and has pro-
vided for recent calls to treatjuvenile delinquents as adults within 
our legal and penal systems.30 
The argument against juvenile liability becomes even more diffi-
cult when one considers that the threshold capacities required for 
criminal responsibility may well be lower than those required compe-
tently to exercise some rights for which children's advocates have 
fought. As Professor Stephen Morse has insightfully explained, the 
crimes for which children are subject to punishment as adults are al-
most always intentional crimes involving the knowing infliction of seri-
ous harm on a victim.31 Adolescents as well as adult offenders know 
that the acts do inflict such harm.32 It seems facially incoherent to 
argue (1) that the adolescent who intentionally shoots and kills his 
teacher should not be held responsible because he lacks even the fun-
damental capacity to realize that shooting someone will inflict serious 
30 Cauffman, et al., supra note 24, at 408-09. 
31 Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
15, 53-54 (1997) ("Adolescent criminal conduct for the most part involves the inten-
tional infliction of harm: the offender intentionally killed, inflicted grievous bodily 
harm, raped, stole, destroyed, or burned. That is, it is the adolescent's conscious 
objective to cause in the immediate future precisely the harm the law prohibits. Un-
less serious adolescent offenders are specially unlucky or unskillful, they are practi-
cally certain to produce the harm that is their conscious objective, and they know 
it."). This is not always the case, of course. For example, a case in New York this 
spring involved a nine-year-old charged with manslaughter for stabbing her girlfriend 
to death during a dispute over a ball. Associated Press, Girl, 9, Charged with Stabbing 
I I -year-old Pal, May 31, 2005, http:/ /www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8044197 (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2006). 
32 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 54. ("The intentional hanndoer knows that 
the conduct invades the interests of others·, those interests may be given little value or 
otherwise ignored or rationalized away, but they must be present to the adolescent's 
mind."). 
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harm, and (2) that adolescents as a class have sufficient maturity and 
judgment to decide whether or not to have an abortion. Reduced to 
its essentials, the claim seems to be that adolescents should be treated 
as adults for the purposes of distributing rights and benefits, and as 
children for the purposes of assigning responsibility and punishment. 
But what justifies that view? Since the very same traits and characteris-
tics-the capacity for instrumental reasoning, an appreciation of the 
consequences of acting, the ability to assess the moral underpinnings 
of one's decision-undergird the arguments for rights and for respon-
sibilities, it is difficult to see what principle or principles support such 
a theory. 
Nonetheless, a burgeoning literature seeks routes around this 
problem, arguing against equal treatment of adolescents in the crimi-
nal law and for the retention of a rule that distinguishes children as a 
class and treats them as non-culpable, or less culpable, for their other-
wise criminal offenses.33 The scholarship does this either by making 
the case that the studies so heavily relied upon by the children's au-
tonomy movement were, after all, badly flawed; 34 or by arguing that 
even if those studies were not inherently flawed on their own terms, 
they did not take account of all relevant adolescent differences, and 
that once such additional differences are considered, it becomes clear 
that adolescents should not be criminally punished on the same terms 
as adults.35 Most recendy, scholars holding this view have hailed the 
33 See, e.g., Brink, supra note 16, at 1585; Cauffman et al., supra note 24, at 404; 
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 801; Bazelon, supra note 13, at 162. 
34 See, e.g., Cauffman et a!., supra note 24, at 406-07 ("Most studies of cognitive 
development that used the informed consent framework have found few major differ-
ences between adults and youth about fifteen years of age and older. However, the 
foundation of this empirical work is fragile, as most of the investigations suffer from 
various methodological limitations, including small, unrepresentative, usually white, 
middle class samples of youth taking part in laboratory studies rather than in studies 
that compare adolescent and adult performance under conditions that adequately 
resemble daily life.»); id. at 408 ("Based in large part on the lack of differences found 
in the informed consent literature, a number of psychologists supported the adoles-
cent autonomy advocates' position. Their assessment of the research was not unani-
mously supported, however, as critics warned that the limitations of extant research 
failed to justifY strong policy arguments about adolescents' equivalence to adults."); 
id. at 411 ("It is our position that the conclusion that adolescent judgment is 
equivalent to that of adults is both tenuous and ill suited for legal policymaking."). 
35 See, e.g., id. at 411 ("We posit that if psychosocial factors are taken into consid-
eration in addition to the cognitive factors that are typically assessed, significant dif-
ferences between adolescents and adults will emerge. Such differences reflect 
genuine differences in capacities ... [that] provide a psychological basis for drawing 
legal distinctions between adolescents and adults.»); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence 
Steinberg, Researching Adolescents' judgment and Culpability, in YouTH ON TRIAL, supra 
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arrival of brain-imaging studies that trace the behavioral differences 
between adolescents and adults to differences in brain development 
between the two groups.36 In 2005 the United States Supreme Court 
entered the fray, holding in the case of Roper v. Simmons"'7 that a de-
fendant who was not yet eighteen at the time he committed inten-
tional murder could not constitutionally be executed for his crime 
because, in large part, relevant differences between juveniles and 
adults make the former less culpable for crime.38 To the extent that 
the Court's rationale transcends the specific context of capital punish-
ment,39 the Court has joined forces with the scholarly wing of the de-
bate and, in a meaningful sense, divided the law from itself. 
In general, the "difference" scholars have limited their discussion 
to comparing adolescents with adults. Most take as a starting assump-
tion that young children should not be held criminally responsible 
under any circumstances. Thus, in general the debate in the litera-
note 11, at 325, 326-37 (differences in adolescents' "maturity of judgment" may jus-
tify different treatment by the criminal law); Elizabeth Scott, Criminal Responsibility in 
Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at 
291, 293 (differences in adolescent decision-making capacity justify different treat-
ment by the criminal law). At a couple of points, Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Stein-
berg suggest that those who believe juveniles should be held responsible for crime 
may be motivated by racism. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 809 ("A troub-
ling explanation for the puzzling hostility toward young law violators is that attitudes 
are driven by racial and ethnic bias."); id. at 837 ("A developmentally-informed 
boundary constraining decisionmakers represents a collective pre-commitment to rec-
ognizing the mitigating character of youth in assigning blame. This concern is criti-
cal, given the evidence that illegitimate racial and ethnic biases influence attitudes 
about the punishment of young offenders and that decisionmakers appear to dis-
count the mitigating impact of immaturity in minority youths."). 
36 See, e.g., Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the 
Law: A Role in juvenile justice?, 3 Omo ST.j. CRIM. L. 321, 327 (2006); Kevin W. Saun-
ders, A Disconnect Between Law and Neuroscience: Modem Brain Science, Media Influences, 
and juvenile justice, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 695, 697-98 (" [N)ew understandings of the 
developing brain lead to the conclusion that children should not be subject to the 
same sorts of punishment that may be appropriate for adult offenders."); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 123-26 (concluding that studies alone cannot determine 
when to hold someone criminally responsible). 
37 543 u.s. 551 (2005). 
38 Id. at 569-75 (detailing differences between juveniles and adults that, in the 
Court's view, lessen the criminal culpability of the former). 
39 It may not. As the basis for its holding the Court discussed differences between 
juveniles and adults that, in its view, explained why defendants under the age of eigh-
teen "cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders"-that is, among 
those offenders who merit the death penalty. Jd. at 553. The Court did not address 
the question of whether juvenile offenders should be criminally liable at all. I d. at 
569. 
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ture focuses on whether offenders of age fourteen or older ought to 
be excluded from criminal liability as a class.40 
But this age-circumscribed discussion, while important in some 
ways, ultimately fails to engage either the dimensions or the nation-
wide attraction of the punitive turn toward children in the criminal 
law. As noted above, that move toward punishing children as adults 
does not merely address the question of whether the age of criminal 
responsibility should be lowered to fifteen or fourteen. In at least 
twenty-eight states, the minimum age at which a child can be trans-
ferred to adult court is under fourteen,4 I and in some states there is 
no lower limit at least for the most serious offenses. 42 Indeed, the 
most controversial cases in recent years involve serious crimes commit-
ted by much younger children who, like Ignacio Bermudez's attacker, 
seem at the time of their acts to "know what they are doing."43 In-
creasingly the law allows such cases to be prosecuted, and such de-
fendants to be punished, in the criminal system. This punitive turn 
toward pre-adolescent children is the latest sign that the law has repu-
diated the philosophy of redemption which generated, and long 
animated, the juvenile justice system, and is replacing it with a belief 
in the necessity of punishing "Bad Seeds."44 At least in part, this belief 
40 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HoFSTRA L. 
REv. 547, 550 (2000) ("[A] justice policy that treats adolescence as a distinct legal 
category not only will promote youth welfare, but will also advance utilitarian objec-
tives of reducing the costs of youth crime."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 799 
(analyzing the case of Lionel Tate). 
41 See, e.g., OFFICE OF juVENILE jUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T 
OF JusTICE, jUVENILE jusTICE 17 (1999) (listing minimum age for judicial waiver in the 
various states). 
42 See, e.g., Beresford, supra note 14, at 800 n.l35. 
43 See, e.g., infra note 52 and accompanying text (recounting case of Nathaniel 
Abraham). Consider, also, the case of Eric Morse, a five-year-old boy who in 1994 was 
thrown off a building to his death by two other boys, aged ten and eleven after he 
refused to steal candy for them. For a detailed account of the murder of Eric Morse, 
see LLOYD NEWMAN ET AL., OuR AMERICA 87-155 (1997). 
44 Contrary to the received scholarly view, our European allies have experienced 
a similar development during the past quarter century. See, e.g., CoNFRONTING YouTH 
IN EuRoPE 25 Qill Mehlbye & Lode Walgrave eds., 1998) (noting that in Europe 
"[t]he age of criminal responsibility varies a lot. In England young delinquents from 
the age of 10 can be prosecuted for their offences. In Scotland this is theoretically 
possible from the age of8. In Ireland this is even the case from the age of7."); id. at 
22-23 ("Shortly after the critical sixties and seventies, macro-evolutions in European 
societies deeply influenced juvenile delinquency and the way to deal with it .... Public 
opinion and governments were inclined towards an increased punitive approach to 
delinquency. The pure rehabilitative model appeared more and more to be naive. 
As a consequence, attention to the :iustice' element in dealing with juvenile offenders 
became more important, including a stricter punishment-orientation."); Maud 
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is premised on the retributive intuition that some children who com-
mit violent crimes are innately, or at least irredeemably, evil, and that 
they deserve to suffer as much punishment as do adults who inflict 
similar harms on society.45 But the continuing controversy over the 
issue indicates that, whatever the law may now allow, as a society we 
are not yet fully convinced of the Bad Seed theory. When it comes to 
punishing children for crime, age does still make a difference. 
If the behavior of Brandon T. would otheJWise qualify him as 
criminally responsible, should the single fact of his age change that 
legal status? If so, why? If not, why do we still flinch at the thought of 
a six-year-old being sent to prison for a brutal, and admittedly inten-
tional, act? Beyond the specific issue of juvenile liability, cases such as 
that of Brandon T. offer the chance to think more broadly about the 
elements of criminal responsibility and the arguments that justify and 
sustain criminal punishment. 
Two intuitions fuel widespread scholarly opposition to punishing 
children for crime. Not coincidentally, they are the same two beliefs 
that gave rise to the juvenile justice system more than a century ago. 
The first goes to the elements of responsibility, claiming that children 
lack the threshold understanding and cognitive capacity to be "guilty" 
for a harmful act.46 The second focuses not on mental capacity per se, 
but on children's inherent potential for growth and change.47 
Whatever a child has done, (s)he is still a child, a person who will 
someday grow up to be an adult. To inflict a long term of punishment 
on a child is, ultimately, to visit suffering on a different being-the 
adult whom the child will become-from the person who committed 
the act. That, the argument goes, is unjust. 
Frouke de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Sec. Gen., Council of Eur., Kilbrandon Lecture: 
Justice for Europe's Children· (Dec. 1, 2003), available at http://www.gccs.gla.ac.uk/ 
pages/kilbrandon.hun. (noting, and regretting, that "the age of criminal responsibil-
ity varies considerably across Member States from as young as age 7 up to age 18"). 
45 For example, Florida state senator Ander Crenshaw has been quoted as saying: 
"There are some (juvenile] offenders who are lost, ... (t]hey have no sense of re-
morse, they are defiant by nature and they are never going to change." Krueger, 
supra note 19. Additionally, when interviewed on Frontline, psychiatrist Martin 
Blinder, who had interviewed the six-year-old who attacked Ignacio Bermudez, 
opined: "The problem, to me, stems from my conviction that this sort of character 
disorder, and certainly a character disorder of this early severity, is probably largely 
genetic. There is something to be said for the phrase 'natural born killer.' It's my 
view that most of what 1 found was predestined by his genetic endowment." Frontline: 
Little Criminals, supra note 12. 
46 See infra Part I.A.2.a-b. 
4 7 See infra Part ILA. 
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In this Article, I use the case of Brandon T. to examine both of 
these intuitions about punishing children for crime. In Part I, I dis-
cuss the elements of criminal responsibility and examine the bases for 
what I call the Culpability Thesis-the claim that children, by defini-
tion and as a class, do not possess the understanding, experience, and 
cognitive capacities necessary to be held criminally liable. I conclude 
that none of these arguments mandates the conclusion that children 
must be categorically excluded from criminal responsibility. 
Working from the conclusion in Part I that children can be crimi-
nally responsible, I move on in Part II to examine the Redemption 
Thesis-the claim that, whatever their mental state and understand-
ing at the time of the harmful act, children's capacity for redemption 
should exculpate them from criminal responsibility. I distinguish the 
issue of corrigibility from that of liability and acknowledge that, al-
though not directly relevant to responsibility, corrigibility might well 
matter to the separate question of how much convicted criminals 
should be punished for crime. I conclude, though, that the Redemp-
tion Thesis-particularly to the extent it is used to draw a bright line 
between adults and juveniles for purposes of the criminal law-is 
more complex than it appears. If the capacity for redemption really is 
a value that should inform criminal punishment, it is a value that cuts 
against separating children and adults for purposes of the criminal 
law. 
In reaching these conclusions I rely on, and make repeated refer-
ence to, the excellent work of Stephen Morse on the subject of juve-
nile responsibility for crime.48 Professor Morse's insights as to the 
proper standard of criminal culpability generally-as to the applica-
tion of that standard to adolescents, and, as to the significance to 
criminal guilt of differences between adolescents and adults-have ad-
ded greatly to the otherwise lopsided scholarly literature on this im-
portant subject. But, like virtually every other commentator on the 
subject, Professor Morse limits his analysis to the issue of criminal lia-
bility for adolescents, and explicitly and categorically excludes young 
children-even those who, like Brandon T., have committed violent 
crimes that have inflicted serious harm-from responsibility on the 
ground that "the issue of full or substantial responsibility is not seri-
ously in contention for young children."49 The current structure of 
the criminal law argues otherwise, and, I contend, only by allowing 
ourselves to think deeply about cases such as those of Brandon T.-
48 See Stephen]. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Di-
agnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CruM. L. 397 (2006); Morse, supra note 31. 
49 Morse, supra note 31, at 52. 
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involving young children who do, in fact, commit heinous offenses-
can we understand, and do justice to, the reasons for the punitive turn 
toward children in the criminallaw.50 
Ultimately, this Article seeks a rational account of the law of crim-
inal responsibility as it actually is, and particularly of the emerging 
view that children, even young children, can and should be criminally 
punished for seriously harmful acts. It is tempting to dismiss this 
profound change in the law with the thought that legislators who 
favor expansion of juvenile liability are simply playing politics, re-
sponding to public concern about juvenile crime in order to get re-
elected and with no thought to the underlying values involved. It is 
true that legislative concern about juvenile crime has sometimes fol-
lowed controversial cases involving horrific acts by very young defend-
ants. 51 But what this reveals is not the superficial nature of politics; 
instead, it demonstrates the weakness of the rationales that have tradi-
tionally supported a separate juvenile justice system. When a six-year-
old plans, strategizes, and ultimately inflicts a terrible harm on some-
one it immediately and graphically gives the lie to the idea that chil-
dren cannot possess the requisite mental capacity to inflict intentional 
harm. When an eleven-year-old caps a record of twenty-three felonies 
by murdering another child in cold blood at the direction of his gang, 
it calls into serious question our assumption that all children can be 
redeemed from a life of crime and, whatever they have done and with 
whatever intent, should be treated rather than punished. 52 And when 
50 Id. 
51 Perhaps the single largest generator of public concern was a series of school 
shootings that took place in the late 1990s. Most of the shootings involved adolescent 
males, and some involved even younger children. See, e.g., Juvenile Violence Time Line, 
WASH. PosT ONLINE, 2000, http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/long 
term/juvmurders/timeline.htm (recounting (among others) the murders committed 
at school by fourteen-year-old Barry Loukaitis in 1996; sixteen-year-old Luke Wood-
ham and fourteen-year-old Michael Carneal in 1997; thirteen-year-old Mitchell john-
son, eleven-year-old Andrew Golden, fourteen-year-old Andrew Wurst, eighteen-year-
old Jacob Davis, fifteen-year-old Kipland Kinkel, and fourteen-year-old Quinshawn 
Booker in 1998; eighteen-year-old Eric Harris and seventeen-year-old Dylan Klebold at 
Columbine High School in 1999). 
52 The case is that of Robert ''Yummy" Sandifer, as described in PAUL H. RoBIN-
SON, CRIMINAL LAw CAsE STUDIES 135 (2d ed. 2002) ("By age 11, [Yummy Sandifer] 
has compiled rap sheet of28 crimes, all but five ofwhich are felonies."). Robinson's 
account goes on to describe the murders of sixteen-year-old Kianta Britten and four-
teen-year-old Shavon Dean, by eleven-year-old Sandifer at the direction of his gang. 
ld. Also consider the Michigan case of eleven-year-old Nathaniel Abraham, who was 
tried and convicted as an adult for a 1997 murder which he committed by shooting 
his victim while perched in a tree. Before the murder, Nathaniel "was already a sus-
pect in nearly two dozen crimes, including burglary, larceny, home invasion, arson, 
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such events repeatedly contradict our assumptions about culpability, it 
is hardly surprising if the public, and the lawmakers it elects, begin to 
question the accuracy of those assumptions. 
It is not only legislators' punitive response to horrific acts by chil-
dren that should hold our attention; it is the revelation, graphically 
and unarguably revealed by this change in laws, that the two rationales 
which have supported the juvenile justice system for more than a cen-
tury may well be dead wrong. That is the reality to which the law has 
responded by expanding juvenile liability for crime. 
But even conceding the above, the law's punitive response is not 
the only possible one. For those many citizens who favor a robust the-
ory of criminal responsibility but also cringe at the idea of sending a 
six-year-old to prison no matter what (s)he has done, the collapse of 
the traditional rationales for excusing juveniles offers an invaluable 
chance to test out the intuition that children should, nonetheless, be 
excused from criminal responsibility. Can that intuition still be justi-
fied, and if so, on what basis? 
If the argument in this Article is correct, a valid basis for a cate-
gorical "youth excuse" will not be found in the rubrics of difference, 
redemptive potential, or lack of mental capacity. In Part III, I suggest 
a new and different justification-one that is grounded not in behav-
ioral or brain differences but in the law's own treatment of, and conse-
quent obligation toward, all children. 
I. BRANDON T. AND THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL REsPONSIBILI'IY 
Suppose that when you first read the description of the attack on 
Ignacio Bermudez you agreed that the perpetrator was guilty of a seri-
ous crime, that the charge of attempted murder seemed appropriate 
in the case. How did you then react when you read that Brandon was 
six years old at the time of the attack? Was your reaction the same as 
that of Harold Jewett, the California prosecutor who brought the at-
tempted murder charge against Brandon? "It doesn't matter whether 
you're 6 or you're 106," said Jewett in an interview. 5 3 "If you do some-
thing that hurts someone else, with knowledge of the wrongfulness of 
it, you're responsible for it, period."54 Or did the single fact of Bran-
don's age make you hesitate? If the latter, why? Did Brandon's age 
give you pause because you think it should matter to his criminal lia-
bility; or because you think that regardless of liability he should not be 
threatening classmates, beating two teenagers with metal pipes, and snatching a wo-
man's purse at gunpoint.n Beresford, supra note 14, at 785 n.9. 
53 Frontline: Little Criminals, supra note 12. 
54 /d. 
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criminally punished; or for some other, independent reason? This 
Part addresses the first possibility, which I call the Liability Thesis. 
A. The Liability Thesis: Mens Rea in Children 
One reason offered in favor of exempting children from criminal 
liability is that they lack the capacity to be mentally culpable.55 Young 
children in particular, according to this argument, are not capable of 
forming the requisite intent, or mens rea, to be responsible even for 
their otherwise criminal acts. This view has a long history. Even 
before the creation of separate juvenile courts in the late-nineteenth 
century, children younger than seven at the time of their acts were 
treated as not responsible for crime, largely on the theory that young 
children lack the capacity to form mens rea, or culpable intent.56 The 
assumption that juveniles lack the requisite mens rea for criminal re-
sponsibility was also a core reason for removing them from the crimi-
nal justice system entirely and creating a separate, non-punitive 
adjudication structure for dealing with juvenile crime.57 But what 
does it mean to say that a person lacks the capacity to form mens rea? 
To answer that we need to work from a theory of what mens rea is and 
what capacities it requires. 
55 See Morse, supra note 31, at 52. 
56 For example, consider the seventeenth-century writings of Sir Matthew Hale 
on the use of the insanity defense in England. 
(Hale] assigned or withheld legal accountability for criminal activity accord-
ing to whether or not the child was doli capax-possessed of the intelligence 
and comprehension to form the blameworthy intent necessary for the com-
mission of a crime. Under the age-based system of classification [devised by 
Hale], a child under seven was termed infantia, by definition doli incapax 
and barred from prosecution for a criminal offense. 
Bazelon, supra note 13, at 168-70. Andrew Walkover traces this idea back to the com-
mon law and notes that "[a]t common law the infancy defense was grounded in an 
unwillingness to punish individuals incapable of forming criminal intent and thus 
incapable of assuming responsibility for their acts.~ Andrew Walkover, The Infancy 
Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REv. 503, 512 (1984). See generally 
Bazelon, supra note 13, at 190 (arguing that the same standard should apply today to 
juvenile offenders who were under age seven at the time of their otherwise criminal 
behavior). 
57 See, e.g., Stephen Bates Billick, Developmental Competency, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 301, 302 (1986) ("The founding premise of the juvenile justice sys-
tem was thatjuveniles were incompetent to commit crimes with the same intent as 
adults because of maturational immaturity .... "). 
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1. The Elements of Criminal Responsibility 
Criminal law doctrine affords two routes to understanding the el-
ements of responsibility. The first focuses on what the state must 
prove to show mental culpability in a criminal trial; the second as-
sumes that the state can prove the elements of a crime, 5 8 and outlines 
conditions under which the defendant might nonetheless argue in 
favor of exculpation. 59 
The first route is fairly straightforward. To make out a prima fa-
cie case the state must show that the defendant did the act which 
caused the originally prohibited harm, and that at the time of the act, 
the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for commission of 
the crime. The Model Penal Code sets out four standards of mental 
culpability-conscious purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negli-
gence.60 Thus, if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant had the conscious purpose at the time of doing the acts 
he's charged with doing and of causing the harm he caused, then the 
state has proven mens rea.61 Where defendant lacks such intent (ei-
ther because he has no capacity to form intent, or for some other 
reason), and such intent is a required element of the crime with 
which (s)he is charged, (s)he has a defense "on the elements," which 
is another way of saying that the state's case will fail for lack of mens 
rea.62 
But even when the state has demonstrated that the defendant 
committed the act with criminal "intent," the defendant may nonethe-
less avoid liability if he or she can successfully advance an affirmative 
excuse or justification. 63 The premise of a justification defense is that 
although the defendant's behavior normally would violate the law, the 
58 See, e.g., Robert E. Shepard, Jr., juvenile justice: Rebirth of the Infancy Defense, 
GRIM. JusT., Summer 1997, at 45, 45 ("[Most states have) greatly liberalized the ability 
of the state to try juveniles as adults."). 
59 MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.01 (1962). 
60 /d. § 2.02. A fifth standard, of strict liability, eliminates the mens rea require-
ment for some (minor) crimes. See id. § 2.05. 
61 Jd. Under Model Penal Code section 2.02(5), higher levels of mens rea suffice 
to prove lower levels. Thus, 
ld. 
[ w] hen the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of 
an offense, such element also is established if a person acts purposely, know-
ingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such 
element also is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When 
acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is estab-
lished if a person acts purposely. 
62 See id. § 2.02(j). 
63 See id. §§ 3.01-.04, 4.01. 
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defendant did the right thing in the particular situation facing him or 
her. The paradigmatic case for justification is self-defense-the de-
fendant acknowledges that he intentionally killed the victim under cir-
cumstances in which defendant reasonably believed that the victim 
presented an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury. 64 In 
that situation (and assuming defendant's claim can be proven), we say 
that the defendant's act was justified, that it was the right thing to do 
under the circumstances. 65 
The other form of affirmative defense is excuse. When defen-
dant lays claim to an excuse she acknowledges that (1) the state can 
prove mens rea (as well as causation and actus reus), and that (2) 
what she did was wrong-her behavior cannot be justified under the 
law.66 Nevertheless, defendant asks to be exonerated from criminal 
responsibility on the grounds of some personal defect or lack of ca-
pacity that would render it unjust to convict her of a crime. The para-
digm here is the excuse of insanity, on the Model Penal Code's 
definition of which defendant may escape criminal liability if, (1) as a 
result of a mental disease or defect, (2) Defendant lacks "substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."67 Notice 
that this suggests the necessity of certain threshold capacities-to ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of one's act, and to have the ability to con-
trol one's conduct to the extent of complying with the law-before 
criminal liability may be imposed. In addition, the affirmative excuse 
of duress illuminates the law's assumption that persons guilty of a 
crime have acted voluntarily and not under coercion by another 
person.68 
64 See, e.g., id. § 3.04(2) (b) ("The use of deadly force is not justifiable ... unless 
the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious 
bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat .... "). 
65 See also id. § 3.02 (explaining that the harm or evil sought to be avoided by 
such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the 
offense charged). 
66 See, e.g., id. §§ 2.04, 2.08, 4.00 (discussing the excuses of ignorance, mistake, 
intoxication, and mental disease). 
67 Id. § 4.01. 
68 See, e.g., id. § 2.09 ("It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the 
conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use 
of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, 
which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to 
resist."). 
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2. Do Children as a Class Lack the Capacities Required for 
Criminal Liability? 
a. Brandon T. and Threshold Culpability 
If the above discussion is correct, the law assumes the presence of 
three threshold capacities when a person is charged with a crime. 
These are ( 1) instrumental rationality, which in turn requires the ca-
pacity to form the conscious purpose to do a thing, to correlate that 
intent with actions capable of achieving it, and to follow through by 
performing those actions which cause the criminal harm;69 (2) the 
capacity to understand the difference between acting rightfully and 
acting wrongfully; and (3) the capacity to refrain from acting wrong-
fully which essentially assumes that defendant did not act under over-
powering compulsion (from inside or outside) that left him with no 
choice but to do wrong. 
Is it true that, as a class and by definition, children lack the 
threshold level of these capacities required for criminal liability? Con-
sider, again, the case of Brandon T. Evidence in that case indicated 
that Brandon ( 1) held a grudge against the parents of Ignacio 
Bermudez; (2) determined to kill Ignacio in order to revenge himself 
on the baby's parents for "harassing him;" (3) recruited accomplices; 
(4) waited until Ignacio's parents were out of the house; and (5) went 
to the baby's room where he brutally beat Ignacio, inflicting enor-
mous and irreparable damage.70 Mter the attack, Brandon T. (1) 
stole a very popular "Big Wheel" tricycle from the Bermudez house; 
(2) warned a potential witness, a little girl, "You better not tell any-
body what I did;" (3) initially lied to police by saying that he didn't do 
it; and ( 4) eventually confessed and reenacted the entire event on 
videotape.71 
It seems clear from the facts that at the time he attacked Ignacio 
Bermudez, Brandon T. (1) intended to perform the acts that harmed 
Ignacio (he did not accidentally knock the baby out of its bassinet; he 
intentionally threw the baby on the floor); (2) did those intentional 
actions with the conscious purpose of harming the baby (when he 
took the baby out of the bassinet and dropped him, he did not think 
that Ignacio would fly out of the room; he knew the baby would fall to 
the floor and that the fall would harm him); (3) knew that if he were 
caught by authorities he would get into trouble; and ( 4) took precau-
69 See Morse, supra note 31, at 25 (reasoning that rationality is the ability to per-
ceive accurately and reason instrumentally); infra text accompanying notes 87-90. 
70 Beck, supra note 1. 
71 !d. 
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tions to prevent this from happening. On its face, Brandon's act was 
intentional and premeditated-not compelled or coerced-and the 
acts were done with the knowledge that if he were caught he would 
probably be punished. 
b. Competence, Character, and Autonomy 
From the perspective of criminal liability, is anything m1ssmg 
from this picture? Consider the following argument: Both the ele-
ments (actus reus and mens rea) and the affirmative defenses (which 
can exculpate despite the undisputed existence of the elements) as-
sume, and proceed from, a background standard that not only dic-
tates the doctrinal content of the existing grounds for exculpation but 
also offers an independent basis for gauging the responsibility (or 
non-responsibility) of particular defendants or group of defendants. 
In the context of juvenile responsibility for crime, Professor Stephen 
Morse has applied the standard of "normative competence."72 Profes-
sor Morse describes normative competence as "the most ... important 
prerequisite to being morally responsible"73 and defines it as "the gen-
eral capacity to understand and be guided by the reasons that support 
a moral prohibition we accept."74 An agent is normatively incompe-
tent (and thus not morally responsible) when he or she "either ... is 
unable rationally to comprehend the facts that bear on the morality of 
his action or is unable rationally to comprehend the applicable moral 
or legal code."75 Rationality, in turn, 
is the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right, and to 
reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately 
and according to a minimally coherent preference-ordering. Put 
yet another way, it is the ability to act for good reasons and it is 
always a good reason not to act (or to act) if doing so (or not doing 
so) will be wrong. 76 
72 Morse, supra note 31, at 24. 
73 !d. at 24-25. 
74 Id. at 25. 
75 Id. 
76 !d. Notice that, on Morse's view, it is not necessary that the defendant acted 
for good, generalizable reasons at the time of the crime. Most offenders presumably 
do not or they would not have offended. The general nonnative capacity to be able 
to grasp and be guided by reason is sufficient. Professor Morse includes within his 
conception of normative competence the requirement of empathy-in his view a de-
fendant who lacks "the ability to empathize and to feel guilt or some other reflexive 
reactive emotion" lacks normative competence and should not be criminally responsi-
ble. ld. at 26. AB Morse acknowledges, this requirement is not now a feature of the 
actual criminal law-the lack of a conscience is not a valid basis for being excused 
from criminal liability. 
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Professor Morse seems to propose normative competence as a back-
ground standard against which the criminal liability of all defendants, 
including adolescent defendants, can validly be measured.77 
But Morse makes it clear that he considers pre-adolescent chil-
dren to be normatively incompetent because of their age. He argues 
that since young children "lack many of the necessary attributes of 
rationality" and "infrequendy commit serious crimes, ... the issue of 
full or substantial responsibility is not seriously in contention for 
young children."78 Morse simply concludes, without analysis, that 
young children are by definition normatively incompetent and that 
they ought therefore to be excluded from criminal responsibility as a 
class.79 
Why is Brandon T. normatively incompetent under the standard 
laid down by Morse? Thinking about this question exposes a perplex-
ing problem with the standard of normative competence itself. Upon 
close inspection, the standard quickly becomes maddeningly elusive, 
offering no clear solution to the problem of responsibility. Consider 
its key terms. To be "normatively competent" (and thus criminally 
responsible) a defendant must possess "the general capacity to under-
stand and be guided by the reasons that support a moral prohibition 
we accept."80 The phrase "general capacity" apparently refers to de-
fendant's abilities as demonstrated in his or her everyday behavior, 
not necessarily to his or her behavior at the time of the crime. The 
question for Morse is does this defendant, in general, possess the "ca-
pacity to understand and to be guided by [good] reasons"?81 If not, 
then defendant is not responsible. If so, defendant is responsible, al-
though his behavior at the time of the crime may well have demon-
strated that he also has the capacity to understand and be guided by 
bad reasons. 82 
But how ought one to apply this standard? To a large degree-as 
Morse acknowledges-the judgments of rationality and normative 
competence in any particular case will rest on moral and political intu-
itions that must remain contingent and debatable.83 "Nonetheless," 
77 ld. at 25. 
78 ld. 
79 ld. 
80 ld. 
81 ld. at 24-25. 
82 ld. at 25-26. 
83 !d. at 25 ("What is the content of rationality that responsibility requires? As 
part of the normative, socially constructed practice of blaming, there cannot be a self-
defining answer. A normative, moral and political judgment concerning the content 
and degree of rationality is necessary."). 
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he argues, "some guid[ance] is possible,"84 and it would seem that 
some definition of the basic terms in the standard is necessary in or-
der for it to have any content at all. 
Consider that in assessing culpability the law generally looks to 
what a defendant was thinking, to his or her mental state at the time 
of the act, not to the defendant's capacities outside of that time frame. 
If the defendant was delusional and killed someone because of a delu-
sion, then (s)he should presumably be excused. If not, not. In many 
or most such cases, the defendant will turn out to have pre-existing 
mental and/ or emotional difficulties, and to the extent these have 
been documented and can be presented at trial, such facts may add 
credence to the defendant's claim that (s)he was delusional at the 
time of the act. But, for example, if defendant has long been para-
noid schizophrenic but kills someone for a wrongful, but non-delu-
sional, reason, this is no excuse although defendant's mental illness 
may, in general, affect his or her ability to understand and obey the 
law.85 Conversely, if defendant in general has the capacity to under-
stand and obey the law but became delusional in this case, the defen-
dant should, presumably, be excused and (evidentiary issues aside) 
the relevance of his or her general capacities is, at best, unclear. 
Second, what does it mean to say that a defendant has, or does 
not have, the "capacity to understand and to be guided by [good] 
reasons"?86 On Morse's view, rationality is the key. Rational compre-
hension involves "the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts 
right, and to reason instrumentally, i~cluding weighing the facts ap-
propriately and according to a minimally coherent preference-order-
ing."87 Fine. But again, what does this mean? What does it mean to 
say that a defendant possesses the general ability to perceive accurately 
(to perceive what accurately?); to get the facts right (which facts?); and 
to reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately? 
(Appropriately? Again, which facts, and according to what conception 
of appropriateness?) On what basis do we decide that a defendant has 
84 Id. 
85 See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006). Eric Clark was a paranoid 
schizophrenic who was found guilty of first degree murder. After announcing to 
classmates that he wanted to kill a police officer, Clark drove a pickup truck at dawn 
to a neighborhood near his home, then blared the radio while circling the block. 
When Officer Jeffrey Moritz responded to calls by the residents, Clark shot him dead. 
Announcing his verdict of guilty to murder, the judge at Clark's bench trial took note 
of the fact that, although he had allowed Clark to present evidence directly connect-
ing his admitted paranoid schizophrenia to the killing of the police officer, no such 
evidence had been presented. Id. at 2716-18. 
86 Morse, supra note 31, at 24-25. 
87 Id. at 25. 
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these general abilities, when (s)he has been accused of an act that 
seems to demonstrate their absence? Answers to such questions are 
key to understanding how the standard would work out in particular 
cases. 
Now consider the standard of normative competence as applied 
to the case of Brandon T. In Morse's view, the law, in deciding 
whether or not Brandon T. is criminally responsible, looks to his gen-
eral capacity for rationality.88 Does Brandon T., in general, possess 
"the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right, and to reason 
instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately and accord-
ing to a minimally coherent preference-ordering?"89 According to 
Morse, a defendant may possess these capacities-and thus be 
deemed responsible for purposes of the criminal law-although (s)he 
failed to demonstrate them at the time of his or her alleged criminal 
actY0 But consider, in this respect, the capacities Brandon T. did 
demonstrate in his attack on Ignacio. Motivated by his desire to hurt 
Mr. and Mrs. Bermudez,91 Brandon T. accurately perceived that harm-
ing Ignacio would injure his parents; devised a plan under which he 
could gain access to the baby; waited for the right moment (when 
Ignacio's parents were not present) to carry out the plan; and after 
successfully putting the plan into action, took steps to avoid what he 
knew would be the unpleasant consequences of getting caught.92 In 
short, Brandon T. clearly demonstrated instrumental rationality, 
knowledge of wrongfulness, a quite sophisticated knowledge of how to 
cause pain to one's enemies, and the executive capacity to unite his 
desire for revenge on Ignacio's parents with a plan that successfully 
put that desire into effect. Given what seems to be a powerful case in 
favor of holding Brandon responsible, the burden shifts here-why, 
despite these facts, should he not be criminally responsible? 
Despite Brandon T.'s demonstrated abilities to perceive accu-
rately, reason instrumentally, and assess the facts and situation appro-
priately (given the end he had in view), perhaps one might argue that 
88 See id. at 24-25. 
89 ld. 
90 ld. at 25-26. 
91 The desire alone, Morse concedes, does not prove Brandon's irrationality. See, 
e.g., id. at 27 ("[E]ven if desires can be construed as irrational, irrational desires do 
not deprive the agent of nonnative competence unless they somehow disable the ra-
tional capacities just addressed or they produce an internal hard choice situation dis-
tinguishable from the choices experienced by people with equally strong, rational 
desires."). Neither of these exceptions would seem to apply to cases such as that of 
Brandon T. 
92 See Beck, supra note 1. 
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Brandon T. nonetheless lacked "the ability to act for good reason" 
that is requisite to a finding of normative competence.93 One could 
attempt this conclusion in two ways. First, one might import a compo-
nent of virtue into one's conception of rationality by arguing, for ex-
ample, that key terms in the definition of normative competence-
such as "accurately" and "appropriately"-refer not merely to defen-
dant's ability to recognize his preferences and to take action that max-
imizes the likelihood those preferences will be realized, but go also to 
the merits of those preferences-perceiving "accurately" means per-
ceiving that hurting a baby is a monstrous thing to do, and weighing 
the facts "appropriately" means (for example) putting less weight on 
one's grudge against the Bermudez family than on the probable harm 
one will cause by beating their child. In short, the standard might 
require that defendant possess a recognizable moral code as well as 
the threshold mental capacity to identify and effectively to act upon 
his preferences. The capacity "to understand and be guided by good ... 
reason[s]" necessarily implies that defendant has accepted those rea-
sons and has the mental wherewithal to apply them, in general, to his 
decisions.94 
But this version of the standard would work very troubling 
changes on the criminal law. Consider the virtue-based standard as 
applied to three defendants, Dl-D3. By hypothesis Dl has the gen-
eral capacity to understand and be guided by the reasons that support 
moral/legal prohibitions, which means that (s)he has accepted the 
relevance of such reasons and can, in general, apply them in making 
decisions. D2 and D3lack the general capacity to understand and be 
guided by good reason, but the lack takes two different forms: (a) D2 
is legally insane, while (b) D3 has consciously rejected good in favor of 
evil-for example DJlacks the capacity for empathy and remorse, and 
without those threshold capacities DJ is unable to understand or be 
guided by good reason.95 
Now consider the relative criminal liability of Ds 1-3 under the 
virtue-based version of normative competence. Dl, the defendant 
93 Morse, supra note 31, at 25. 
94 ld. at 23 (emphasis added). 
95 In theory we might imagine two subspecies of D3, DJ(a) and D3(b). One can 
coherently imagine DJ(a), who once possessed the capacity for empathy and remorse, 
but made the choice to suppress them in order to acquire wealth, position, or power. 
For the purposes of moral evaluation such a defendant might merit different treat-
ment than DJ(b), who lacks empathic ability but may or may not have adopted affirm-
atively evil values. However, in the case of a D whose lack of empathy, however 
acquired, leads him or her to commit violent offenses against innocent others, Ds 3(a) 
and 3(b) may be functionally identical for the purposes of the criminal law. 
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who possesses and (in general) displays the capacity to be guided by 
good reasons is criminally responsible although the crime (s) he com-
mitted presumably failed to demonstrate such capacity. If D2 is in-
sane, (s) he merits an excuse under the virtue-based standard, and this 
result is entirely uncontroversial. In that situation the standard adds 
nothing to existing doctrine or to the particular debate over juvenile 
responsibility under the law.96 But Morse would go much farther, 
mandating that D3 must also be excused.97 And this is what makes the 
virtue based standard so troubling. Dl, the defendant who in general 
has the capacity to act on good reasons because (in part) (s)he ac-
cepts the moral standards they represent, is criminally responsible. 
D3, who does not accept the good reasons supporting the moral 
prohibitions of the law because his lack of empathic ability has de-
prived him of a conscience (and he therefore lacks an internal coun-
terbalance to his violent and evil desires) and therefore lacks the 
"capacity" to understand and be guided by them, is not criminally re-
sponsible under the virtue-based conception. 
The standard of normative competence represents Professor 
Morse's attempt to lay out a proper basis for evaluating the blamewor-
thiness of all defendants.98 He must be saying, therefore, that D3 is 
less blameworthy for his or her criminal actions than is Dl. But this 
seems wrong. Suppose that Ds 1 and 3 are charged with intentional 
murder. Dl understands and accepts that killing is wrong, but al-
lowed her intense hatred of a particular victim, Vl, to overcome that 
moral prohibition. D3 raped V3 because he felt like it, and then 
killed her in order to prevent her from testifYing against him for the 
rape. On what grounds could we plausibly conclude that D3 is less 
blameworthy for his actions than DJ?99 
96 Presumably everyone agrees that where a juvenile defendant is legally insane 
that defendant, like any other defendant, merits an excuse. The debate about juve-
nile liability concerns cases in which the defendant is concededly not insane but is 
nevertheless developmentally different from adults in various ways deemed relevant. 
On the ultimate relevance of such differences to the law, see infra text accompanying 
notes 127-30. 
97 Morse, supra note 31, at 26 ("After much thought, I have come to the conclu-
sion that normative competence should require the ability to empathize and to feel 
guilt or some other reflexive reactive emotion."). 
98 See, e.g., supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
99 Indeed, an initial intuition might be that Dl is clearly less culpable than the 
others, since almost by definition he would seem to lack the ability to do the kind of 
deliberate and premeditated murder that DJ might commit. Dl's capacity to commit 
such a murder has in fact been defined away by the virtue standard; the most serious 
form of homicide of which Dl would appear capable would be one in which his moral 
restraint is overcome by a strong emotion such as rage or fear-and thus becomes the 
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This seems to be where Morse's normative requirement of em-
pathic ability comes in. A second, and potentially related, way of find-
ing Brandon T. to be normatively incompetent would be to add a 
requirement of empathic ability to the responsibility standard. Morse 
might argue, for example, that D3 should be excused from criminal 
responsibility on grounds of fairness because the lack of capacity to 
feel empathy and remorse makes DJ "not amenable to reason."100 
This does seem to be a key link, in Morse's mind, between responsibil-
ity in general and responsibility in children. 101 
Since Professor Morse acknowledges that psychopathy is not in 
fact a basis for excuse under the criminal law as it exists, 102 Morse's 
empathy argument expressly moves the discussion from the descrip-
tive to the prescriptive. And the prescription seems profoundly 
wrong. The result of making empathetic capacity a necessary compo-
nent of normative competence would be that those offenders, like D3, 
who lack remorse and fellow feeling would be excused from criminal 
liability and punishment on those grounds. And this would be a per-
nicious result, for at least three reasons. 
First, while it seems to be the case that many violent criminals are 
psychopaths, it is not the case that all psychopaths are criminals. In-
deed, recent evidence indicates that psychopaths exist in all walks of 
life, many quite legal.1°3 If such research is true, it may well be the 
possible basis for a partial excuse due to provocation or extreme emotional 
disturbance. 
100 Morse, supra note 31, at 26 ("Perhaps people who lack the capacity for empa-
thy and guilt-the so-called 'psychopaths'-are particularly immoral and deserve spe-
cial condemnation rather than excuse, but this does not seem fair. To the best of our 
knowledge, some harmdoers simply lack these capacities and they are not amenable 
to reason. They may be dangerous people, but they are not part of our moral com-
munity."); see also MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 4.01 (2) (1962) ("A person is not responsible 
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mutual disease or 
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."). 
101 Professor Morse identifies the capacity for empathy as a "critical distinguishing 
variable" and argues that if adolescents "lack the general capacity for empathy that is a 
component of full moral agency ... then adolescents as a class may be less responsible 
moral agents in general and might deserve mitigation, if not full exoneration." 
Morse, supra note 31, at 60. Morse goes on to acknowledge, however, that the law 
does not excuse (adult) psychopaths on grounds of their lack of empathy. !d. at 61. 
"On my theory of responsibility," he adds, "such people should be excused and I wish 
to proceed as if the law followed." !d. 
102 !d. at 60-61. 
103 See, e.g., Belinda jane Board & Katarina Fritzon, Disordered Personalities at Work, 
11 PsvcHOL., CRIME & L. 17, 18-25 (2005) (comparing personality traits of successful 
business managers and patients at Broadmoor Hospital, one of Britain's highest se-
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case that most psychopaths-that is, most people who lack the capac-
ity to feel empathy and remorse-demonstrate both the inclination 
and the capacity to stay on the right side of the law. Since, by defini-
tion, they do not obey the law because they respect other people or 
because breaking the law would make them feel guilty, presumably 
they obey it for other reasons. Among those reasons are the costs as-
sociated with being criminally prosecuted and punished for commit-
ting a crime. Excusing psychopaths from criminal punishment would 
dramatically reduce the strength of this disincentive, and therefore 
dramatically reduce the psychopath's interest in remaining law-
abiding. 
Professor Morse's argument focuses more on the deontological 
bases for punishment-the question of whether defendant deserves 
punishment or not-than on utilitarian ones. But the point is impor-
tant because it suggests that the common view of psychopathy and its 
relationship to crime is quite impoverished. We often discuss psycho-
paths as though their deficits-in the capacities for empathy and re-
morse-constitute a sufficient explanation of their criminal misdeeds. 
But this is in fact a highly debatable assumption. Consider a psycho-
pathic killer like Ted Bundy, who was executed in Florida in 1989 af-
ter confessing to the murders of more than thirty women. 104 In the 
public mind, Bundy has come to symbolize the psychopath, a person 
who is relentlessly self-focused, manipulative, and incapable of empa-
thy or remorse. But these deficits by themselves are not a sufficient 
explanation of Bundy's murderous career. Again, most psychopaths 
(if pyschopathy is defined this way) do not commit violent crimes, 105 
and most certainly do not travel coast to coast for the purpose of mur-
dering women. What explains the difference between Bundy and the 
law-abiding psychopath is not the absence of empathy and remorse, 
curity hospitals). Business managers scored higher than patients on measures of his-
trionic, narcissistic and compulsive personality; such traits are thought to reflect 
psychopathic characteristics such as superficial charm, lack of empathy, and perfec-
tionism. Id. at 25. Unlike the Broadmoor patients, the business managers scored 
lower on antisocial, borderline, and paranoid personality traits, indicating lower levels 
of aggression, impulsivity, and mistrust. Id. The authors suggest that the business 
managers may be examples of "' [s)uccessful psychopaths ... people with psycho-
pathic [personality disorder] patterns, but without the characteristic history of arrest 
and incarceration." Jd. at 18-19 (quoting Donald R. Lynam et al., Self-Reported Psy-
chopathy: A Validation Study, 73 J. PERSONAL11Y AssESSMENT llO, Ill (1999)). 
104 John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assess-
ment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL 
CaNST. LJ. 483, 486 n.5 (1996). 
105 See Board & Fritzon, supra note 103, at 18-19 (noting growing empirical re-
search into "successful" psychopaths who avoid arrest and incarceration). 
2006] PUNISHING CHILDREN IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 455 
but that absence combined with the presence of the desires to hurt, kill, and 
do other kinds of serious harm to people. What prompted Bundy to kill was 
not the mere absence of empathy for his victims or anticipatory re-
morse for killing them; but the absence of those things combined with 
the presence of the desire to kill women. Most people, whether psychopaths 
or not, do not have this desire. Bundy deserved criminal punishment 
not because he was a psychopath but because he possessed the affirm-
ative intent to, and did, commit murder, while recognizing that the 
acts he did were blameworthy and would be condemned by society. 
It may of course be true that lack of empathic ability makes it 
more difficult for a psychopath to obey the law, in the sense that one 
barrier to law-breaking-what we call "conscience"-is missing from 
the psychopath's mental toolkit. But, as Morse acknowledges, the fact 
that some people find it more difficult to obey the law than others is 
not, and should not be, valid grounds for an excuse from criminal 
responsibility. 106 The criminal law is properly indifferent to such 
claims. A defendant will not be heard to argue that he should be 
excused for an otherwise criminal action because he has a very impul-
sive temperament; because he is quick to anger and has a strong ten-
dency toward violent expression of his rage; or, even because he 
suffered an abused and loveless childhood and never learned to treat 
others with care and respect. Yet all of these things can make it more 
difficult-in many cases much more difficult-for defendants to resist 
their desire to harm. Why is lack of a conscience different in kind 
from these other character and personality defects, such that the par-
ticular defect of lack of empathy should be singled out as the basis for 
excuse and these other lacks may not? Considering the very great 
harm of which psychopathic criminals are capable and that they do, in 
fact, inflict on society, more thought must be given to these questions 
before legally sane psychopaths are excused from criminal 
responsibility. 
Nor is such an excuse necessarily implied by the normative com-
petence standard itself. One could make a quite compelling argu-
ment that Ted Bundy easily met the standard-that he possessed, and 
consistently demonstrated, the "ability to perceive accurately, to get 
the facts right, and to reason instrumentally, including weighing the 
106 Morse, supra note 31, at 28 ("Those who are fortunate enough to be especially 
brave and those who are of average braveness will be able to meet [the standard of 
normative competence] quite readily. Those who are of less than average disposi-
tional firmness will have more trouble resisting when they should. Still, if we judge 
that the person had the general capacity to comply with the reasonable firmness stan-
dard, even if it is harder for her than most, then she will be held responsible if she 
yields when a person of reasonable firmness would have resisted."). 
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facts appropriately and according to a minimally coherent preference 
ordering." 107 
Thus, the standard of normative competence offers no clear and 
valid basis on which to excuse Brandon T. from criminal responsibil-
ity. And Morse's proposal to make responsibility dependant on the 
capacity for empathy would produce the untenable and unwarranted 
result that the most dangerous, violent, and evil-minded criminals 
among us would be excused from responsibility for their criminal 
actions. 
But what if children as a group lack empathiccapacity, or have 
less of it than adults? Shouldn't such a (temporary) disability absolve, 
or at least reduce, their liability for crime, on the grounds that this 
lack makes it more. difficult for them to obey the law? As a normative 
matter this is an interesting question-but it requires an additional 
argument explaining why children should be excused on those 
grounds although adults possessing the same defect are not. Beyond 
that, and as a descriptive matter, it strikes me as quite implausible to 
say that children, even children as young as six, lack a threshold level 
of empathy as a group. The vast majority of children do not attempt 
to murder other people, and recent evidence indicates that those who 
do are both quite rare and are much more likely than other children 
to become psychopaths and/or lifelong criminal offenders.108 To the 
extent that refraining from doing violent harm to others requires 
some threshold level of empathy, the burden of proof should be 
placed on those who would claim that children as a group lack this 
quality. 
B. The Relevance of Facts and Contact 
But perhaps the above moves too quickly. Even on a minimalist 
account such as the one offered here, it must be true that criminal 
responsibility requires some understanding of at least certain facts 
and context. After all, the mens rea of conscious purpose requires 
that the defendant understand and intend the probable consequences 
of his actions. 109 Homicide, for example, is often defined by state stat-
ute as the "unlawful killing of a human being."110 In a homicide case, 
107 I d. at 25. 
lOB See infra notes 159-61. 
109 MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 2.02(2) (a) (1962) ("A person acts purposely with respect 
to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the dement involves the nature of his 
conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that 
nature or to cause such a result .... "). 
llO See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 187(a) (West 1999). 
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a defendant cannot be guilty of murder or attempted murder unless 
he or she understood, at the time of the killing, what it means for a 
person to die. If a defendant really believes that when you kill some-
one they come back to life the next day, it would be wrong to hold 
him guilty of murder or attempted murder since he doesn't compre-
hend an essential fact about the harm resulting from his purpose and 
his actions. At a minimum, understanding the "essential facts" about 
killing someone requires the knowledge that when someone dies they 
are gone for good. The younger children are, the less likely they are 
to understand such facts, and-the argument might go-this lack of 
understanding should render young children non-culpable for homi-
cide or attempted homicide. 
In the case of Brandon T., the evidence conflicted on the ques-
tion of whether he understood what it means to kill or to die. On the 
one hand, Brandon's own father had been murdered when the child 
was four. Brandon knew that his father had died violently and the 
child was given to fantasizing about the event. 111 On the other hand, 
Brandon's defense attorney and at least one court appointed expert 
concluded that the boy did not understand what it meant to kill a 
person, and on the basis of those opinions the court ultimately 
amended the criminal charge from attempted murder to assault with 
intent to commit bodily harm.112 Thus, the case offers no convincing 
111 Frontline: Little Criminals, supra note 12 (interviewing Brandon T.'s defense at-
tomey, John Burris). 
112 I d.; see alsoCurtius, supra note 6 (describing how "(t]he case faded from public 
view only after a Juvenile Court referee ruled that the assailant could not understand 
his offense"). It is noteworthy, however, that psychiatrist Martin Blinder, one of three 
mental health professionals who interviewed Brandon T. in order to evaluate his com-
petency, found the boy competent to stand trial. In an interview with Frontline, Dr. 
Blinder described the process by which he reached that decision: 
I must say, in truth, I was surprised after I completed my assessment to 
find the 6-year-old competent. My bias going in was, "This is ridiculous. 
How can a 6-year-old be competent to stand trial? How could he have even 
understood what he was doing, no less what a trial is all about?" But the kids 
watch television and they watch the cop shows and they watch the lawyer 
shows and they have-they may not watch them like they watch "Sesame 
Street," but kids are tremendously aware these days. So this kid certainly was 
aware that he was in deep trouble and that there were certain procedures 
that were likely to befall him. 
He understood that society considered what he had done wrong, which 
is why he was being locked up at juvenile hall. He knew the judge's task. He 
knew his lawyer was there to help him. He knew the prosecutor was going to 
gather the evidence against him. And he understood that if things didn't go 
his way, he might not go home to see his mommy for a long, long time. So 
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argument that six-year-olds as a class must be exempted from liability 
for homicide. The question of exemption hinges on the answer to the 
prior question of what exactly a defendant must know about death 
and about killing before he or she may be criminally blamed for a 
homicide. At a minimum, it seems clear that defendant must under-
stand some things about the nature of the harm (s)he inflicted: that 
killing someone causes their permanent departure, perhaps. On such 
a threshold view defendant is chargeable if (s)he (1) understands that 
killing someone ends their life, which means at least that he or she is 
gone forever, and (2) that society considers this wrong. 
The discussion thus far should alert us to the presence of a 
broader issue. As a general matter, we might hypothesize that a per-
son may be found criminally responsible only if (s)he understands the 
facts requisite to the harm that motivates the criminal prohibition 
(s)he is charged with violating. Thus, murder is criminally prohibited 
because killing someone removes the person permanently from the 
world and this inflicts a terrible and irreparable loss, not only on the 
person killed but also on those attached to and/ or dependent on that 
person. Defendant must at least understand ( 1) the fact of the injury, 
(2) its permanence, and (3) that inflicting this loss is considered 
wrong. There was some evidence that Brandon T. did in fact under-
stand all these things, and under such a standard he could therefore 
be held responsible. 
It is of course possible to embellish the theory in a way that would 
exclude more, or all children from liability, but doing so would neces-
sitate a comparison with the standards of criminal responsibility as ap-
plied to defendants generally. One could argue, for example, that in 
order to be held liable for homicide a defendant must know not only 
that killing someone is considered wrong and that it removes the per-
son permanently, but that doing this violates rights possessed by the 
victim, specifically the right not to be murdered. On this theory it 
might well make sense to exempt many or all pre-adolescent children 
(certainly children as young as Brandon T.) from liability for homi-
cide on the ground that they are unlikely to understand the process of 
and the effect of a victim's death, and are also unlikely to compre-
hend what a "right" is and why society might enforce it. But quite 
clearly we do not apply this richer standard when an adult defendant 
is charged with homicide. Suppose adult defendant AD is charged 
with murder and there is no doubt that AD did the acts that caused 
despite his juvenility, I felt that he grasped the essentials of what a trial pro-
ceeding was, why he was going to be tried and what the penalties might be. 
Frontline: Little Criminals, supra note 12. 
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the victim's ( V) death. AD could not defend the murder charge on 
the ground ( 1) that although his killing of V means that V is gone 
from the earth and will not return, Vis now in Heaven living with God 
and therefore AD's action was justified because he actually conferred 
a net benefit on V; or on the ground (2) of AD's (genuine) belief that 
people do not, in fact, have a "right" to life or even a right not to be 
arbitrarily killed-their continued existence depends solely on their 
ability to defend themselves against any and all attacks by others. For 
the purpose of prosecuting AD for murder, it would simply not matter 
how sincere or well-documented AD's belief in the afterlife, or in the 
law of the jungle, happened to be-the law does not inquire, or admit 
into its official inquiry, the details of defendant's beliefs in death un-
less those beliefs are otherwise relevant to an already existing excuse 
such as insanity. Needless to say, neither of the beliefs described 
above would alone merit such an excuse. 
C. Other Differences as Basis for the Youth Excuse 
Some would argue that whatever the evidence in favor of finding 
intent, there are other differences in cognitive, emotional, and social 
capacity between children and adults, and these differences are so 
great that it is simply unjust for the criminal law to hold children to 
the same standard of behavior as adult._. This argument is the thrust 
of much recent scholarship in the area of juvenile culpability.ll 3 In 
general, the scholarship focuses on differences between adolescents 
and adults, attempting to demonstrate that adolescents are less averse 
to risk, more likely to value short-term benefits over long-term costs, 
and more likely to be influenced by their social environment than 
adults, 114 and that these differences ought to serve either as a com-
plete bar to criminal liability for juveniles, 115 or as a partial bar to such 
113 See Brink, supra note 16, at 1557-58; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 801; 
Bazelon, supra note 13, at 162. 
114 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 812-16; id. at 813 ("[E]ven when 
adolescent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful decision making 
may still differ due to immature judgment. The psycho-social factors most relevant to 
differences in judgment include: (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes toward and per-
ception of risk, (c) temporal perspectives, and (d) capacity for self-management. 
While cognitive capacities shape the process of decisionmaking, immature judgment 
can affect outcomes because these developmental factors influence adolescent values 
and preferences that drive the cost-benefit calculus in the making of choices."). 
115 See, e.g., Brink, supra note 16, at 1585 ("The trend to try juveniles as adults is 
inconsistent with retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrent rationales for punishment 
and with the related rationales for having a separate system of juvenile justice in the 
first place. A sound criminal jurisprudence requires that we stop treating juvenile 
offenders as little adults."). 
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liability. 116 The scholarship usually draws on behavioral studies dem-
onstrating that adolescents as a class have weaker future-orientation 
than do adults as a class; that they take more health and safety risks 
than do adults as a class; and that they are more impulsive than adults 
as a class. 117 These differences, the argument concludes, reduce ado-
lescent blameworthiness and (thus) criminal culpability. us 
Most recently this difference-based approach has received a pub-
lic relations boost from medical technology. To the behavioral studies 
demonstrating some differences between adolescents and adults with 
respect to things like risk taking and long term focus are now added 
studies of brain function that allegedly support those conclusions. Ad-
vances in brain imaging technology have allowed researchers to ob-
serve the ways in which the brain changes from childhood, through 
adolescence, and into adulthood. Studies indicate that the brain ma-
tures throughout adolescence, and indeed well into adulthood.119 In 
particular, recent studies suggest that development of the brain's fron-
tal lobe, which is a key factor in regulating impulses in adults, is not 
complete until some time after age twenty one. 12° 
However, as Professor Morse has correctly pointed out, the legal 
relevance of such information is far from clear. 121 First, this very same 
brain research indicates that brain maturation peaks at least several 
years beyond age eighteen, the legal age of majority. A possible impli-
cation of this finding is that the legal age of majority should be raised, 
say to twenty-two or twenty-five, by which time the brain is more fully 
116 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 800 (advocating "a model under 
which immaturity mitigates responsibility-but does not excuse the criminal acts of 
youths who are beyond childhood"). 
117 ld. at 829-30. 
118 ld. 
119 See, e.g., Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 36, at 324; Lee Bowman, New 
Research Shows Stark Differences in Teen Brains, ScRIPPS HowARD NEws SERVICE, May 11, 
2004 ("In fact, the brain's gray matter has a final growth spurt around the ages of 
eleven to thirteen in the frontal lobes of the brain, the regions that guide human 
intellect and planning. But it seems to take most of the teen years for youngsters to 
link these new cells to the rest of their brains and solidify the millions of connections 
that allow them to think and behave like adults."). 
120 For example, consider a study led by Nitin Gogtay of the National Institute of 
Men tal Health in which researchers performed magnetic resonance imaging· every 
two years on thirteen people between the ages of four and twenty-one. The results 
indicated that the frontal lobes of the brain were the last to develop fully, and that the 
brain changes continued up to age twenty-one, the oldest age examined. See, e.g., 
Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SciENCE 596, 596 
(2004). 
121 Morse, supra note 48, at 406. 
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developed. 122 Even further, the studies now trumpeted as demon-
strating "stark differences" between adolescent and adult brains also 
show that brain development continues well into a person's forties 
and fifties. 123 At what point in a person's brain development does 
(s)he become criminally responsible? The studies themselves cannot 
answer that question. Instead, they simply expose us to the truth that 
ultimately, criminal responsibility is a matter of moral judgment 
rather than of scientific fact-finding. 124 Indeed, many scientists warn 
against the use of brain imaging technology to determine moral or 
legal culpability.125 They caution that no existing technology can 
prove a causal connection between brain structure and particular be-
havior, and that imaging should not, therefore, be forced into the ser-
vice of assigning, or excluding, any particular person from legal 
responsibility. 126 
122 Beckman, supra note 120, at 596 ("Some say [brain] growth maxes out at 
twenty. Others ... consider 25 the age at which brain maturation peaks."); see also 
Bowman, supra note 119 (" [S] orne scientists would put off the age of legal majority to 
22 or 23."). 
123 Bowman, supra note ll9 ("Even in adulthood, the wiring job is not completely 
done. Imaging done on the brains of people in their 40s and 50s show there's an-
other surge of connections being made, perhaps in response to menopause or to 
prepare the brain to better compensate for the loss of brain cells as we age."). 
124 Professor Morse has made the same point. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 20 
("[A] legally responsible agent is a person who is so generally capable, according to 
some contingent, normative notion both of rationality itself and of how much capabil-
ity is required .... These are matters of moral, political, and ultimately, legal judg-
ment, about which reasonable people can and do differ."). 
125 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 119 (" [R] esearchers say that while it's possible to 
gain general understanding about brain development and function from the images, 
the notion that medicine, law enforcement or anyone else should work from some 
ideal, normal brain model is troubling. 'Each individual is not an exact map, and the 
difficulties in determining what the range of variations are is really dangerous. The 
data is incredibly easy to be over-interpreted,' said Sonia Miller, a New York attorney 
who specializes in cases dealing with new technologies."); see also id. ("Dr. Peter 
Bandettini, a brain-imaging researcher at the National Institutes of Health, said the 
science of understanding what small structures and chemicals are doing within the 
brain is far from a gold standard for mental function or age. 'Right now, I personally 
think you'd get more information about a person's mental age by going to a set of 
behavioral tests.'"). 
126 Beckman, supra note 120, at 599 ("'We couldn't do a scan on a kid and decide 
if they should be tried as an adult,' [Sowell} says."); see also id. ("Although many re-
searchers agree that the brain, especially the frontal lobe, continues to develop well 
into teenhood and beyond, many scientists hesitate to weigh in on the legal debate. 
Some, like Uay] Giedd [of the NIMH], say the data 'just aren't there' for them to 
confidently testifY to the moral or legal culpability of adolescents in court."). 
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The fact of difference does not, by itself, mandate any particular 
moral or legal result. As Professor Morse has explained, variations in 
ability or behavior between persons do not mandate differences in 
legal treatment or responsibility. Differences are only relevant to the 
extent that they impact on a pre-existing standard of responsibility. 
That standard cannot be dictated by the differences. Instead, the dif-
ferences must be measured against the standard in order to deter-
mine the responsibility of any particular defendant or group of 
defendants. 127 
Thus, the fact that adolescents and adults may be somewhat dif-
ferent in ways that affect their general judgment and decision-making 
capacity does not answer the question of whether adolescents ought to 
be held liable for serious crime. Further, as Morse points out: 
A substantial minority of adults is similar to mid-to-late adoles-
cents on the variables that distinguish the age cohorts as classes. As 
noted, although the means may significantly differ, there is a great 
deal of overlap between the distributions. A regrettable number of 
adults are immature and have dreadful judgment. Yet we do not 
excuse that minority of adults. Why, therefore, should adolescents 
be treated differently? Adults obviously have more experience with 
the consequences of their behavior and more life experience gener-
ally and some mature as a result, but many do not. Impulsive or 
peer oriented adults probably have always "learned" less from expe-
rience than their more mature counterparts. Moreover, it does not 
take much life experience to understand how killing, raping, burn-
ing, stealing, and so on affects others. To understand the conse-
quences of these actions does not require the sophistication and 
moral subtlety that only experience can provide.I28 
127 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 49 ("The question of juvenile responsibility is 
not simply whether juveniles are generally different from adults. Surely they are in 
many ways. The real issue is whether they are morally different, and the resolution of 
that issue depends on whether a moral theory we accept dictates that the variables 
that behaviorally distinguish juveniles should also diminish their responsibility."); id. 
at 50 ("If responsibility is treated as a matter of retrospective moral evaluation, as I 
suggested it essentially is and should be, then the plasticity or amenability to treat-
ment of a variable is irrelevant to whether it diminishes moral responsibility. Respon-
sibility should be mitigated or excused if a variable that diminishes responsibility was 
operative at the time of harm doing, whether or not this characteristic is alterable, and 
vice versa. It is hard to imagine what moral theory would suggest that plasticity per se 
should reduce responsibility. To the extent that fault is a necessary or sufficient con-
dition for full responsibility, plasticity is irrelevant."). 
128 Id. at 58. Also see, NoiVin Richards, Criminal Children, 16 LAw & PHIL. 63 
(1997), who rejects arguments that adolescents should be presumptively nonculpable 
for crime because of their relative lack of life experience: 
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Of course, it may be the case that some, many, or even most chil-
dren lack the necessary capacities to be held guilty of crime. But if 
this is true, it serves only as an argument for evaluating juvenile de-
fendants individually (as we do all other defendants) for the purpose 
of deciding whether or not they meet the test of criminal responsibil-
ity. This question is usually decided during the criminal adjudication 
process rather than by a bright-line a priori rule that bars, or even 
presumptively bars, children from criminal responsibility. 
Thus, the mainstream literature on juvenile responsibility makes 
a core, and erroneous, assumption: that if children as a class think 
differently from adults as a class, these differences ought to matter to 
children's criminal responsibility. But this simply does not follow. In-
deed, it is hard to see why the mere fact that there exist differences in 
judgment and decision-making capacity between juveniles and adults 
is at all relevant to the question of juvenile liability for crime. Instead, 
the core questions ought to be, (1) what are the threshold capacities 
required for criminal liability, and (2) do juveniles have those capaci-
ties?129 This inquiry, in turn, has both normative and descriptive 
dimensions. With respect to the normative dimension-upon what 
threshold capacities should the law insist before holding someone 
guilty of a crime?-many different answers are possible, and the issue 
of differences between juveniles and adults is only derivatively rele-
vant. With respect to the descriptive dimension-what threshold ca-
pacities does the law in fact insist upon before holding someone 
criminally liable?-comparisons between all juveniles and all adults 
are much less relevant than comparisons between juvenile and adult 
criminals. To answer the descriptive question what we need to know is 
not whether juveniles differ from adults but whether adults who have 
been convicted and punished for committing serious crimes differ, as 
a class and in relevant ways, from juveniles who have committed sub-
stantively identical acts. Surely no one would be surprised to discover 
that as a group, violent adult felons possess weaker future orientation, 
are less risk-averse, and are more impulsive than either adults or 
Take murder, for example. The main thing wrong with murdering someone 
is that you take this person's life against his will. [Adolescents] certainly 
know that much about it. Indeed, if they did not know they were taking 
someone's life against his will they would not be guilty of murder at all, but 
of some lesser crime .... What we need is an extra, additional wrong done 
in committing murder, a wrong that adolescents do not realize they are do-
ing because they lack experience in life. There are no obvious candidates. 
!d. at 72-73. 
129 See, e.g., supra Part l.A.2. 
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juveniles generally.130 The harder question is, do violent adult offend-
ers demonstrate significantly different levels of future orientation, risk 
aversion, and impulsivity than do juveniles who commit the same of-
fenses? Only if that question can be answered in the affirmative might 
such differences be allowed to affect the criminal blameworthiness of 
individuals in either class. 
Finally, consider the argument that adolescents may be more sus-
ceptible to environmental influence, from peers and surrounding so-
cial pressures, and are therefore more likely to feel pressured into 
criminal acts than are adults.131 From the perspective of culpability 
for crime, this argument seems to cut both ways. If juveniles are more 
likely to be influenced by the signals from their environment, and 
they otherwise possess the threshold capacities for criminal responsi-
bility, then perhaps the law should focus on sending strong anti:-
"criminogenic"132 signals to the class of potential juvenile offenders. 
In this connection, evidence indicates that juvenile offenders are 
often well aware that the law treats them more leniently than it does 
adults, and that some are quite willing to take advantage of this fact. 
Street gangs, for example, actively recruit young children for criminal 
acts because they know that such children are unlikely to be convicted 
and punished as criminals.133 And some individual offenders are no 
less savvy. Recall the murder by Christopher Simmons, which became 
the subject on appeal of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Roper 
v. Simmons, 134 that defendants who are under age eighteen at the time 
130 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 53 (acknowledging that, as a class, adolescents 
are less risk-averse, more impulsive, and are more susceptible to peer pressure than 
adults). 
I d. 
It is crucial to remember, however, that a finding of a statistically significant 
difference between groups does not mean that there is no overlap between 
them. In fact, the adolescent and adult distributions on these variables over-
lap considerably; large numbers of adolescents and adults are indistinguish-
able on measures of these variables. 
131 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 832 ("[A)dolescents in high crime 
neighborhoods are subject both to unique social pressures that induce them to join in 
criminal activity and to restrictions on their freedom that tangibly limit their ability to 
escape. These restrictions are constitutive of a well-defined legal status resulting from 
youthful dependency that substantially limits autonomy."). 
132 See, e.g., id. ("[T)hose whom psychologists call normative adolescents may well 
succumb to the extraordinary pressures of a criminogenic social context."). 
133 For example, Paul Robinson recounts the case of Robert "Yummy" Sandifer, 
who joined the "Black Disciples" in Chicago at age eight by explaining: "Young mem-
bers like Robert are prized because they are immune from detention for more than 
30 days." RoBINSON, supra note 52, at 134. 
134 543 u.s. 551 (2005). 
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of their crimes may not be executed. 135 Simmons, who was seventeen 
at the time of his crime, informed two friends that he wanted to mur-
der someone by breaking into the victim's house, tying the victim up, 
and throwing the victim off a bridge. 136 According to the account 
offered by Justice Kennedy in his mcyority opinion for the Court, Sim-
mons and one of his friends then selected Shirley Crook as their vic-
tim and carried out their plan to the letter. 137 Before the murder, 
Simmons had confidently informed his friends that they could "get 
away with it" because they were juveniles.138 To the extent that 
juveniles are especially sensitive to the criminogenic elements in their 
environment, perhaps failing to punish blameworthy adolescent of-
fenders for crime actually adds to the pathological content of that 
environment? 
Evidence of juvenile responsiveness to environmental influence 
raises another core issue-that of corrigibility, or the potential for re-
habilitation among juvenile offenders. That is the subject of Part II, 
to which I now turn. 
II. THE REDEMPTION THESIS: PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 
I noted above that the almost universal academic opposition to 
juvenile criminal liability is rooted in two widely held intuitions, one 
involving children's potential guilt and the other involving their po-
tential redeemability. 139 Part I evaluated the Culpability Thesis; in this 
Part I examine the Redemption Thesis, the idea that even when the 
state can prove the elements of a crime and can show that at the time 
of the criminal act a juvenile offender was mentally culpable, it is 
wrong to punish juveniles for crime because they have a greater capac-
ity than adults to reform and become productive, non-offending 
citizens. 
135 Id. at 569. 
136 !d. at 556. 
137 Id. at 556-57. ("Using duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth and bind her 
hands, the two perpetrators put Mrs. Crook in her minivan and drove to a state park. 
They reinforced the bindings, covered her head with a towel, and walked her to a 
railroad trestle spanning the Meramec River. There they tied her hands and feet 
together with electrical wire, wrapped her whole face in duct tape and threw her from 
the bridge, drowning her in the waters below."). 
138 Id. at 556. 
139 See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. 
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A. Culpability v. Corrigibility 
Opponents of juvenile liability argue that "only a relatively small 
proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities 
develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into 
adulthood. Thus, predicting the development of relatively more per-
manent and enduring traits on the basis of risky behavior patterns 
observed in adolescence is an uncertain business."140 Once again, this 
addresses the wrong question. It is certainly true that most risk taking 
juveniles turn out to be productive and law abiding adults. But this 
fact alone does not justify excluding juveniles as a class from criminal 
responsibility. Instead, we must first answer a much more relevant 
question: What percentage of violent juvenile offenders-juveniles 
who have killed someone, or seriously attempted to do so, or have 
committed armed robbery or assault and battery on another person-
turn their lives around and become peaceful and law abiding adults? 
If virtually all such juveniles do so, then a persuasive case might be 
made for sentencing juvenile cases on a treatment, rather than a pun-
ishment, model. If, on the other hand, most such juvenile offenders 
continue to inflict serious harms on society until they are stopped by 
force from doing so, then the redemption-based case for exempting 
juveniles from punishment becomes much weaker. 141 
It should be clear that a defendant's corrigibility-the relative 
ease with which an offender or class of offenders might turn their lives 
around-cannot determine a defendant's culpability for an act already 
140 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 819-20. 
141 See, e.g., Benjamin B. Lahey et al., Relation of Age of Onset to the Type and Severity 
of Child and Adolescent Conduct Problems, 27 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PsvcHOL. 247, 247 
(1999) ("Numerous researchers have reported a robust inverse relation between the 
age of a youth's first conviction and his or her total number of convictions through 
early adulthood. Youths who are first convicted earlier are convicted more times not 
only because they began their 'criminal careers' earlier but also because they are con-
victed at higher rates at all ages into early adulthood. It is important to note that the 
same inverse association has been found between age of onset and self-reported delin-
quent behavior in several community samples. This is important, as self-reports of 
delinquency avoid the biases in detection, prosecution, and conviction that are inher-
ent in official statistics." (citations omitted)); id. at 248 ("Moffitt coined the terms 
'adolescent-limited' and 'life-course persistent' delinquency for these two groups of 
youths. She hypothesized that youths who first engage in antisocial behavior during 
childhood do so for different reasons than youths who first engage in antisocial be-
havior during adolescence. . . . (Although it should not be regarded as a closed ques-
tion], the notion that there is an inverse relation between the age of onset of 
antisocial behavior and the severity and persistence of antisocial behavior has had a 
major impact on theories of delinquent behavior and the taxonomy of [conduct dis-
orders)." (citations omitted)). 
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done. 142 But corrigibility and culpability are often confused in this 
context-even by the United States Supreme Court, which declared in 
Roper v. Simmons that "[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be mis-
guided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a 
greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be 
reformed."143 But this must be wrong. To the extent that a defen-
dant's personal blameworthiness informs our decision about her crim-
inal guilt for an already completed act-and few would deny that it 
does144-the likelihood of future criminal actions (or law abidingness) 
cannot decide the liability issue. Ultimately, the decision as to liability 
rests on our judgments about the person's mental culpability at the 
time he or she did the act charged; mental culpability, in turn, centers 
on what the person understood, desired, and was capable of doing at 
that moment in time or during preparations beforehand. Thus, statis-
tics purporting to show that young children in general are more ame-
nable to treatment than adults, or that most adolescents grow out of 
the tendency to engage in impulsive or risky behavior, add nothing to 
the general debate about the elements of liability. 
But this should not drive the issue of redemptive potential from 
the criminal process altogether. Although corrigibility cannot answer 
the question of liability for crime, it may well influence the decision as 
to how much punishment a convicted criminal should receive. This 
seems an avenue worth exploring, not least because if the discussion 
in Part I of this Article is correct, mens rea offers only a very unstable 
142 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 50 ("If responsibility is treated as a matter of 
retrospective moral evaluation, as I suggested it essentially is and should be, then the 
plasticity or amenability to treatment of a variable is irrelevant to whether it dimin-
ishes moral responsibility. Responsibility should be mitigated or excused if a variable 
that diminishes responsibility was operative at the time of harmdoing, whether or not 
this characteristic is alterable, and vice versa. It is hard to imagine what moral theory 
would suggest that plasticity per se should reduce responsibility."). 
143 Raper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
144 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 16-17 ("I make the assumption, which is 
almost universally shared in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence, that desert 
based on moral fault is at least a necessary pre-condition for just punishment. If 
youths are to be adjudicated and punished like adults, it is therefore crucial to ad-
dress the desert of youthful offenders."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 800 
("The starting point [of our argument] is the principle of penal proportionality, 
which is the foundation of any legitimate system of state punishment, Proportionality 
holds that fair criminal punishment is measured not only by the amount of harm 
caused or threatened by the actor, but also by his blameworthiness."); Franklin E. 
Zimring, Penal Proportionality J!Yr the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and 
Diminished Responsibility, in YouTH ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at 271, 272 ("A host of 
subjective elements affect judgments of deserved punishment even though the victim 
is just as dead in each different case."), 
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bar to criminal liability. If children may only be excluded from crimi-
nal punishment to the extent that they are unable to form intent, 
then only very young children-younger than six-year-old Brandon 
T.-may be categorically excluded. But to a significant degree, our 
uneasiness about punishing children for crime rests not on the intui-
tion that children are incapable of intentional action, but on the intui-
tive judgment that children are more easily reformed than adults-
that to send someone to prison for life for an act, even a monstrous 
act, committed while a juvenile is to waste a life that might well have 
been productive if allowed to grow to adulthood outside of prison. 145 
B. Should Corrigibility Affect Punishment? 
From the discussion above we can import the interim principle 
that a defendant's capacity for rehabilitation enters the equation once 
culpability has been established and the law is seeking to resolve the 
question of punishment. "Is this person criminally responsible for 
what he did?" is quite a different question from: "Should we punish 
this person for what he did?" Our collective answer to that second 
question has undergone dramatic changes over the past century. 
The recent punitive turn toward juveniles in the criminal law, de-
rives its core energy not from statistical differences between children 
and adults, but from a sea change in our beliefs about crime and 
criminals generally. The system of juvenile justice arose only seconda-
rily because of children's perceived "differences;" its primary source of 
inspiration was a view of human nature that could hardly be more 
different from the view that now dominates our system of criminal 
punishment. 
1. The Reign of Redemption 
The change is evident in the title of Frank Allen's well known 
book, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal. 146 A century ago, belief in 
the criminal law as an agent of redemption reigned; that belief has 
now virtually disappeared from the practices of the criminal law.147 
And the decline of that ideal in general may explain the criminal law's 
punitive turn toward children in particular. 
145 As Stephen Morse points out, on a purely retributive theory of punishment this 
might not matter. Morse, supra note 31, at 50. But on a mixed theory, under which 
both retributive and utilitarian concerns enter into the kind and degree of criminal 
punishment inflicted-the likelihood of reform might be a valid or even important 
factor on the utilitarian side of the calculus. Jd. at 50-51. 
146 fRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981 ). 
14 7 /d. at 32-33. 
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More than two decades ago, Frank Allen foresaw this trend and 
made it the basis for his Storrs Lectures at Yale. Allen wrote: "Al-
though judgments may vary about precisely how far support for reha-
bilitative theories of penal treatment has eroded ... the central fact 
appears inescapable: the rehabilitative ideal has declined in the 
United States: the decline has been substantial, and it has been pre-
cipitous."148 Allen contrasts that decline with the near universal en-
dorsement of that ideal, by lawmakers, courts, reformers, and the 
academy, at the beginning of the twentieth century. 149 In their book 
Reaffirming Rehabilitation,150 authors Francis T. Cullen and Karen E. 
Gilbert trace the belief in rehabilitation to the rise of the Progressive 
movement in the United States in the early 1900s.I 5 I The Progressives 
united strong opposition to retributivismi 52 with a transcendent opti-
mism about the possibilities of a just state and-particularly relevant 
here-of redeeming criminals via treatment rather than punishment. 
Cullen and Gilbert wrote: 
The flavor of the Progressives' perspective is well illustrated in 
these 1912 remarks by Warren F. Spaulding, Secretary of the Massa-
chusetts Prison Association: "Each criminal is an individual, and 
should be treated as such .... Character and not conduct is the only 
sound basis of treatment. Fundamental in the new scheme is ... 
individualism. In the old system, the main question was, What did 
he do? The main question should be, What is he? There can be no 
148 !d. at 10. 
149 !d. at 5 ("Appreciation of the decline of the rehabilitative ideal in the 1970s 
requires an accurate understanding of its dominance in the United States for most of 
the twentieth century."). Among other examples, Allen notes the U.S. Supreme 
Court holding in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), declaring that 
"' [r )etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation 
and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurispru-
dence."' ALLF.N, supra note 146, at 5 (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 248). Allen adds, 
"There can be no doubt that Justice Black's dictum expressed the enlightened opin-
ion, not only of the judiciary, but also of the public at large." !d. 
150 FRANcis T. CuLLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982). 
151 Id. at 73-81. 
152 Id. at 75-76 ("At the turn of the century, Charlton T. Lewis voiced sentiments 
that would be echoed repeatedly in the years to come when he asserted that '(t]he 
method of apportioning penalties according to degrees of guilt implied by defined 
offenses is as completely discredited, and is as incapable of a part of any reasoned 
system of social organization, as is the practice of astrology or ... witchcraft.' n ( quot-
ing Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE LJ. 17, 18 (1889))). Lewis 
prophesied, "the time will come when the moral mutilations of fixed terms of impris-
onment will seem as barbarous and antiquated as the ear-lopping, nose-slitting and 
head amputations of a century ago." Lewis, supra, at 29. 
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intelligent treatment until more is known than the fact that a man 
did a certain thing. It is as important to know why he did it." 153 
As Cullen and Gilbert explain, the Progressives' belief in individ-
ualized treatment had a profound impact on the criminal law: 
[T] he Progressives succeeded in a major renovation of the criminal 
justice system. Within the space of two decades, their innovations 
reformulated sentencing practices in the direction of indetermi-
nacy, established the new bureaucratic structures of probation and 
parole, created a separate system of juvenile justice, introduced wide dis-
cretionary powers throughout the legal process, and reaffirmed the 
vitality of the rehabilitative idea. At the end of their era, nearly all 
of the elements of the criminal justice system familiar to today's stu-
dents of crime control were securely in place. Of equal significance, 
the Progressives bequeathed a powerful rationale for the individual-
ized treatment of offenders that would dominate American correc-
tional policy until very recent times. 154 
Note the implication: The non-punitive, treatment focused juve-
nile justice system was not created in isolation from the criminal jus-
tice process for adults, but merely as one part of the Progressives' 
general plan to restructure the criminal law around the goal of reha-
bilitation. Cullen and Gilbert wrote that "the Progressives' therapeu-
tic model received its most complete expression in the measures 
formulated to control delinquent behavior."155 The juvenile justice 
system was just one manifestation-· -albeit a very important one-of a 
widespread redemption-oriented ideology, an ideology that "received 
its most complete expression" in the non-punitive treatment of youth-
ful offenders.156 
2. The Origin of Separation 
But then what, on the Progressive model, explains the actual sep-
aration of juvenile offenders, and their separate treatment by the 
criminal law? Despite the widespread popularity of the redemptive 
approach in the early and mid-twentieth century, adult offenders were 
never actually exempted from criminal guilt and punishment; only 
juveniles were. 
153 CuLLEN & GILBERT, supra note 150, at 77 (alteration in original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Warren F. Spaulding, The Treatment of Crime-Past, Present, Future, 3 J. 
AM. INST. CRJM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 376, 378 (1912)). 
154 Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
155 Id. at 80. 
156 /d. 
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To some extent this difference in treatment of juveniles and 
adults simply reflected the limits of the politically possible rather than 
any core difference in punishment rationales. The Progressives envi-
sioned a system under which punishment would take a back seat to 
rehabilitation for all criminal offenders, but even during the heyday 
of this vision the pull of retribution was strong enough to prevent the 
replacement of punishment with treatment for everyone.157 
It also seems true, however, that the fundamental principle un-
derlying Progressive reform proposals for the criminal law generally-
that is, their belief in the redemptive potential of all human beings-
does suggest a basis for distinguishing between adults and juveniles 
within a general framework of a corrections policy oriented toward 
rehabilitation. If (as the Progressives believed) humans generally 
have the capacity for redemption, and if that capacity justifies a thera-
peutic (as opposed to retributive) system of criminal sentencing, then 
youthful offenders may have an even stronger case for treatment, and 
against punishment, than do adults as a group. Remember that with 
respect to the question of criminal culpability, the scholarship argues 
that children lack relevant capacities, such as the ability to form intent, 
or maturity of judgment. That lack, it is contended, ought to absolve 
them from criminal responsibility, or at least diminish their responsi-
bility, for crime.I58 But when we move to the issue of punishment, the 
children's rights argument takes on the opposite thrust. Children, it 
is argued, have a greater capacity than adults in at least one area-the 
capacity for change. Children are in process, are acutely susceptible 
to environmental influences and such influences can greatly affect 
their ultimate choices, behavior, and moral convictions. If even adult 
criminal offenders have significant capacity for reform and rehabilita-
tion (as the Progressives believed), then it seems to follow that chil-
dren must possess such capacity to a greater, and perhaps to a much 
greater, degree. 
C. Age and Corrigibility 
It is tempting to conclude that even if children are sometimes 
responsible for crime, it might not be good policy to punish them, or 
at least to punish them as much as we do adults. On the widely ac-
cepted assumptions that (1) the state should limit the amount of de-
157 See, e.g., id. at 81 ("The Progressives' version of a criminal justice system fully 
dedicated to the rehabilitation of criminal offenders was never achieved. While the 
framework of a therapeutic state had been erected, the substance in many instances 
was lacking."). 
158 See supra Part I.A.2. 
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liberate suffering it inflicts on people to that amount that achieves its 
legitimate policy goals and no more, and that (2) one of the most im-
portant goals of punishment is that of specific deterrence, children's 
greater redemptive potential may justify lesser punishment for the 
crimes they commit. 
But is it true that children as a class do, in fact, have more re-
demptive potential than do adults as a class? Some recent research 
indicates that this intuition may be baseless-.that some youthful of-
fenders, particularly those who begin committing serious crimes as 
young children, may be quite difficult, or even impossible, to rehabili-
tate. As one recent article summarized the problem: 
Numerous researchers have reported a robust inverse relation 
between the age of a youth's first conviction and his or her total 
number of convictions through eady adulthood. Youths who are 
first convicted earlier are convicted more times not only because 
they began their "criminal careers" earlier but also because they are 
convicted at higher rates at all ages into early adulthood. It is im-
portant to note that the same inverse association has been found 
between age of onset and self-reported delinquent behavior in sev-
eral community samples. This is important, as self-reports of delin-
quency avoid the biases in detection, prosecution, and conviction 
that are inherent in official statistics. Among 11- through IS-year-
old boys who had engaged in any delinquent behavior, Tolan found 
that the half of the sample with younger ages of onset (<12 years) 
reported higher levels of almost all types of delinquent behaviors 
during adolescence than the half of the sample with later ages of 
onset. Similarly, in a subset of female and male youths from the ... 
National Youth Survey, Tolan and Thomas found that youths who 
reported first engaging in delinquent acts before age 12 were more 
likely to engage in serious offenses and to continue to engage in 
delinquent behavior during the 3 years following the onset of delin-
quent behavior. 159 
Such findings, indicating "an inverse relation between age of onset 
and the frequency, seriousness, and persistence of delinquency," 160 re-
159 Lahey et al., supra note 141, at 247 (citations omitted). 
160 /d.; see also Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisrr 
cial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PsvcHoL. REv. 674, 690 (1993) (discussing 
the tendency of some adolescents over others to continue their delinquent behavior 
into adulthood). Professor Lahey credits Moffitt with coining the terms "adolescent-
limited" and "life-course persistent" to describe two quite different developmental 
pathways of delinquent activity and goes on to explain; 
[Y]ouths who first engage in antisocial behavior during childhood do so for 
different reasons than youths who first engage in antisocial behavior during 
adolescence. Specifically, childhood-onset conduct problems result from 
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inforce one intuition that seems to fuel the punitive turn of the crimi-
nal law toward juveniles-that there are in fact "Bad Seeds," who show 
their criminal proclivities early, have little or no capacity for remorse 
or reform, and who will continue to inflict harm on society until the 
criminal law puts them out of commission. Individual cases in which 
very young children commit atrocious crimes may reinforce this 
impression.161 
According to psychiatrist Martin Blinder, six-year-old Brandon T. 
was clearly in danger of becoming a "life-course persistent" of-
fender.162 For Dr. Blinder-who evaluated Brandon to determine his 
competency to stand trial for the assault on Ignacio Bermudez-the 
signs were so marked in Brandon that, despite his youth, Blinder felt 
confident in diagnosing him as a "psychopath in the making."163 Con-
sider this exchange between Dr. Blinder and an interviewer for the 
television program Frontline: 
Q: (W]hat were your first impressions of [Brandon T.]? 
Blinder: My first impression was a perfectly ordinary, smiling, 
outgoing young man. There was nothing about his demeanor or 
his appearance to suggest that we were dealing with either a danger-
early neuropsychological deficits that cause cognitive delays, impulsivity, and 
difficult temperament. In the presence of adverse childrearing environ-
ments, these characteristics contribute to the origins of conduct problems. 
In contrast, the adolescent-onset group does not have predisposing neurop-
sychological dysfunction. Their delinquent behavior arises through the imi-
tation of some of the nonaggressive antisocial behaviors of youths with 
childhood onsets. They do so during adolescence because it is a period of 
heightened peer influence and conflict regarding adult privileges. 
Lahey et al., supra note 141, at 248. 
161 See, e.g., the case of Robert Sandifer, who at age eleven murdered two teenaged 
gang rivals. RoBINSON, supra note 52, at 134. Of Sandifer's childhood, Paul Robin-
son writes: 
Robert's direction of development shows itself early. During a hospital stay 
when he is not yet 3, a social worker says something that angers him. He 
grabs a toy knife and charges the woman, screaming "Fuck you, you bitch.» 
He jabs the rubber knife into the woman's arm, saying 'Tm going to cut 
you." 
... His first officially recforded offense, at age 9, is an armed robbery. 
By age 11, [Yummy Sandifer) has compiled a rap sheet of 28 crimes, all but 
five of which are felonies. His short detentions become less frequent when, 
because of his violence toward other detained children, Family Services ref-
uses to accept even temporary custody. 
ld. at 134-35. 
162 Frontline: Little Crimina£5, supra note 12. 
163 !d. 
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ous fellow, or one who was wrestling with mental retardation or 
some obviously disabling psychiatric disorder. 
Q: And following your examination, what diagnosis did you ar-
rive at? 
Blinder: I felt that he was a psychopath in the making. We tend 
to reserve such a label for adults and we talk about juveniles who act 
out in violent ways as suffering a conduct disorder. The use of the 
term psychopath or antisocial personality is perhaps prematurely 
pejorative and we don't ordinarily see the necessary signs and symp-
toms in one so young and someone so smalL So we don't use that 
terms [sic) ... when we talk about juveniles. I certainly have never 
used that term before. But this young man was so evidently suffused 
with all of the findings, that, when they fully blossomed later in life, 
will call for this diagnosis, that I was comfortable in talking about 
him having a nascent sociopathic personality. Or a psychopath in 
the making. 164 
164 Interview with Dr. Martin Blinder, Forensic Psychiatrist, available at http:/ I 
www. pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/ shows/little/ interviews/blinder l.html. Asked 
to speculate about Brandon T.'s probable future, Dr. Blinder's prognosis was grim: 
!d. 
I can say that the personality characteristics that I found in this young boy, 
that seemed to drive him, and the absence of any inhibiting factors, the ab-
sence of empathy for his fellow kid and some of the other diagnostic features 
[that) are so common in individuals who do go forward in a life of violence 
and a life of crime, that I think we should have a great concern that we will 
indeed be faced with what to do with this fellow on down the road .... 
When he has his freedom and he has a bit of heft to him, I think statistically 
there is some likelihood that he will act in a criminal fashion. Whether or 
not ... this young man will definitively grow up to be John Dillinger, I can't 
say. But I think had I examined John Dillinger when he was 6 years old, I 
would have seen qualities very much like what I saw in this young man. 
Asked "what can be done with a 6-year-old like this?", Dr. Blinder's response was no 
more hopeful: 
What do you do with a 6-year-old like this? One thing that works is that you 
sequester them. So that they no longer have the society to attack. There are 
obviously a variety of ethical, moral and psychological reasons why this may 
not be a good or a permanent solution. But it's very tempting. To make 
sure that they don't have the opportunity to do the kind of damage that we 
know they are capable of. They are, at least theoretically, responsive to long-
term psychotherapeutic intervention .... The problem, to me, stems from 
my conviction that in this sort of character disorder-and certainly a charac-
ter disorder of this early severity-it is probably largely genetic. Yes, cer-
tainly, being raised in a violent neighborhood and in a violent or less than 
optimum home ... these things are not therapeutic. . . . But if it brings to 
the table, if you will, a certain genetic structure, it's very difficult to modifY 
that through behavioral or psychotherapeutic techniques. 
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It may, in short, be true that at least some juvenile offenders-
those who begin committing serious crimes while children and who 
demonstrate neither empathy toward others nor remorse for the 
harm they inflict-may be difficult or impossible to rehabilitate. And 
this may be true although such youngsters are not legally insane; al-
though they may appear to be normal in many ways; and although 
they may understand that society condemns their actions and that, if 
caught, the consequences of those actions could be extremely 
unpleasant. 
To the extent this is correct, it becomes more difficult to justify a 
system of juvenile justice that treats all children as non-responsible 
and/ or as non-punishable. Such a system makes the conscious deter-
mination to allow youthful defendants who intentionally commit seri-
ous crimes to remain outside the system of criminal punishment solely 
because of their age. And that decision requires a stronger justifica-
tion than has yet been offered to support it-especially because a sys-
tem under which children are evaluated individually, and the decision 
to punish them is made individually, would seem to be a more rational 
method of balancing the legitimate interests of youthful defendants 
against society's need for protection from violent offenders of any age. 
This conclusion follows whatever the ultimate source, or cause, of 
a particular juvenile's criminal behavior. Because children are so visi-
bly under the control of adults, we tend to excuse their bad behavior 
on the ground that the adults in their lives-or the societal environ-
ment in which they grow up-are the parties "really" responsible for 
their acts. 165 But even setting aside the criminal law's general dislike 
of assigning vicarious responsibility for crime, this approach proves 
too much. A substantial, perhaps an overwhelming, percentage of 
adults convicted of serious crimes such as murder, rape, and aggra-
vated assault, suffered significant abuse as children and could persua-
sively argue that the abuse is causally related to their criminal actions 
as adults. If we excuse children from punishment on the ground that 
they have suffered from abuse, then we are intellectually compelled to 
consider the identical argument in a case involving a severely abused 
adult for whom the abuse is at least a but-for cause of the crimes with 
which he is charged. 
!d. Psychopaths are specifically excluded, in the Model Penal Code and state criminal 
codes, from eligibility for the insanity defense on grounds of psychopathy. See, e.g., 
MODEL PENAL CooE § 4.01 (2) (1962) (excluding psychopaths from successfully ad-
vancing the insanity defense solely on grounds of psychopathy); see also TEx. PENAL 
CoDE ANN.§ 8.01 (b) (Vernon 2003) (excluding abnormality manifested only by crim-
inal or antisocial behavior from the insanity defense). 
165 See supra notes 112-14, 128 and accompanying text. 
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CoNCLUSION 
Consider the argument thus far. First, Part I concluded that the 
longstanding basis for excluding juveniles as a class from criminal lia-
bility-that children and adolescents as a class are incapable, or are 
less capable, than adults of forming criminal intent-is not true. Us-
ing the case of Brandon T. as a core example, I argued that even 
young children can and do commit terrible crimes while possessing 
the threshold capacities necessary for criminal responsibility. From 
this perspective, the recent trend in the law-its increasing refusal to 
insulate all juveniles, merely because of age, from criminal responsi-
bility-is not irrational; on the contrary, it simply acknowledges that 
the concept of mens rea, as it has been descriptively applied in our 
criminal law, contains no internal bar to criminal responsibility for 
children. 
In Part II, assuming the potential for culpability, I explored the 
most important basis for excluding juveniles from criminal punish-
ment-namely, that juveniles as a class have a greater capacity for re-
demption than adults as a class. I discussed recent evidence 
indicating that at least some juveniles-those who lack empathy, are 
not remorseful for the harms they inflict, and begin violent lives of 
crime before age twelve-may be difficult or impossible to rehabili-
tate. Once again, if this is true then the punitive turn toward juveniles 
appears rational. It seems rational to acknowledge ( 1) that such per-
sons deserve punishment, and (2) that society has a strong interest in 
funneling them through the criminal process, to the extent of incar-
cerating them for long periods in order to prevent them from in-
flicting further harm on innocent victims. Moreover, representing 
such incarceration as punishment rather than as treatment could have 
anti-criminogenic effects on violent juveniles and/ or on juvenile risk-
taking generally. 166 
166 Thus, for "adolescent-limited" offenders, whose behavior is marked by, and 
motivated by, life-stage specific concerns such as peer influence and increased taste 
for risk, criminal sentencing might focus on maximizing the potential for redemp-
tion. For "life-course-persistent" offenders, society's interest in self-protection might 
dictate the infliction of more suffering, either because stronger tactics are required to 
turn such juveniles around, or because we are prepared to acknowledge that rehabili-
tation is impossible in some cases; that some young offenders will continue to inflict 
harm unless they are permanently removed from society. Of course it may often be 
difficult-in some cases it might even be impossible-to tell with certainty which 
juveniles are redeemable and which are not. Even if we begin the inquiry by acknowl-
edging that some young offenders will end as psychopaths, and even if we have an 
inkling about who they might be, the law should reach a very high level of certainty 
about such things before incarcerating a teenager for life. 
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Why, then, do most of us still cringe at the thought of sending a 
six-year-old to prison, or to execution-even for an admittedly horren-
dous and intentional act? It is not because children can't act inten-
tionally; they can. It is not only because children are more 
redeemable than adults; not all are, it would seem; and if most are, 
there is still the question of desert, of culpability for the act done, 
whatever one hopes for reform in the future. We can hope that clear-
ing away the debris left by the failed Culpability and Redemption the-
ses will not have the effect of sending numberless troubled children to 
prison, but will instead lead to a deeper exploration of the widespread 
intuition that, despite the fact that they can do horrible and intention-
ally harmful acts, children should not be punished criminally, at least 
to the same degree and in the same way as adults. 
What explains the enduring strength of that intuition? I want to 
suggest one possible answer. It's an answer that the law should take 
seriously because it addresses a core tension in the way the law itself 
treats children, and thus invites a specifically legal response. 
Consider, on the one hand, the law's general attitude toward the 
rights and status of children. Although the law of crime prohibits 
adults from torturing children or subjecting them to abuse, the law 
also affirmatively, and vigorously, enforces the rights of parents to di-
rect the rearing, physical care, education, discipline, and external en-
vironment of their children. 167 Thus, assuming no evidence of 
parental abuse, children normally have no legal recourse when their 
parents decide to divorce, move, change their children's school, disci-
pline their children, direct their religious education, or monitor their 
social lives. The law-the United States Constitution itself-defends 
parents' rights to make such decisions, 168 and thus enforces the con-
167 See, e.g.,James Dwyer, "Parents' Religion and Children s Welfare: Debunking the Doc-
trine of Parents' Rights," 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1372 (1994) ("For those who would have 
the State use its power and resources to improve the lives of children, parental rights 
constitute the greatest legal obstacle to government intervention to protect children 
from harmful parenting practices and to state efforts to assume greater authority over 
the care and education of children. Legal commentators, whatever their views on the 
proper distribution of child-rearing authority between parents and the State, univer-
sally assume that parents should have some rights with respect to the raising of their 
children." (footnote omitted)). My thanks to Professor Dwyer for comments that 
helped clarify the thinking in this section. 
168 The Supreme Court has affirmed the rights of parents in a long line of deci-
sions beginning in the 1920s. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) 
("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and man-
agement of their child is protected by the 14th Amendment, and does not evaporate 
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of 
their child to the State."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting 
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finement of children to their families until the age of majority. No 
other group of (unconvicted and uncommitted) persons is thus invol-
untarily subordinated, by law, to the power and authority of other 
individuals. 
At the same time it enforces the control of children by the family, 
the law-as this Article makes clear-increasingly treats children as 
autonomous adults for the purposes of criminal conviction and pun-
ishment. A strong argument can be made that this is both profoundly 
contradictory and patently unjust. Substantial empirical evidence sup-
ports the widespread intuition that most children who commit violent 
crimes come from backgrounds featuring core environmental and re-
source deficits as well as serious abuse and/ or deprivation within their 
families. 169 As noted, absent evidence of serious abuse, the law en-
forces the confinement of children to those families. Unlike adult 
criminals who, whatever their sufferings as children are not, by defini-
tion, living in legally-enforced subjection to their parents at the time 
of their crimes, children of poverty-that is, most children who com-
mit violent offenses-have been prematurely and often continuously 
exposed to environments that make it all but impossible for such chil-
dren to internalize the values implicit in the criminal law and to adopt 
those values as their own. It seems unjust, in that context, to hold 
children-especially young children who have had the least opportu-
that custody, care, and nurture of children reside first in the parents, "[a]nd it is in 
recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) 
(noting that the Constitution protects liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment protects rights of par-
ents to direct education of their children). 
169 See, e.g., Patrick F. Fagan," The R£al Root Causes of Violent Crime: The Breakdown of 
Marriage, Family, and Community" 1 (Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1026 (1995), 
available at http:/ /www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/BG1026.cfm ("A review of the 
empirical evidence in the professional literature of the social sciences gives policy-
makers an insight into the root causes of crime. Consider, for instance: Over the past 
thirty years, the rise in violent crime parallels the rise in families abandoned by fa-
thers. High-crime neighborhoods are characterized by high concentrations of fami-
lies abandoned by fathers. State-by-state analysis by Heritage scholars indicates that a 
10 percent increase in the percentage of children living in single-parent homes leads 
typically to a 17 percent increase in juvenile crime. The rate of violent teenage crime 
corresponds with the number of families abandoned by futhers. The type of aggres-
sion and hostility demonstrated by a future criminal often is foreshadowed in unusual 
aggressiveness as early as age five or six. . . . On the other hand: . . . Even in high-
crime inner-city neighborhoods, well over 90 percent of children from safe, stable 
homes do not become delinquents. By contrast only 10 percent of children from 
unsafe, unstable homes in these neighborhoods avoid crime."). 
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nity to perceive and make use of any exit options available-fully re-
sponsible as criminals, even for violent acts that inflict significant 
harm. 
Significantly, this is not a concern rooted in psychological or be-
havioral differences between children, or adolescents, and adults. 
Whatever differences in ability, temperament, or proclivities separate 
children from adults, it is almost certainly true that some children, 
even pre-adolescent children, do possess the capacity to form intent, 
do have a threshold understanding of the harm they intend to inflict, 
and do possess the ability to assemble the means and execute on a 
plan to commit that harm. Holding such children criminally responsi-
ble is not unjust because of any innate internal differences between 
children and adults-but because of the different treatment of chil-
dren by the law, the law's confinement of children to criminogenic 
situations from which those children, unlike adults, have little or no 
opportunity to escape. The law contributes to the predicament in 
which they grow up, and the law, therefore, should acknowledge that 
contribution by making it relevant to the question of criminal respon-
sibility when the defendant is a child. 
Other defenses of the "youth excuse" are of course possible; a full 
exploration of such arguments is not possible here. If this Article has 
offered a rational account of the national trend toward making 
juveniles liable for crime and punishing them seriously for serious 
crime, then it would seem that the traditional grounds for the "separa-
tion thesis"-the idea that children should be segregated from adults 
for the purpose of acljudicating crime and deciding punishment-
have broken down under the pressure of the undeniable truth that 
children do commit terrible crimes and that the prospects for re-
deeming at least some juvenile criminals may well be just as grim as 
the prospects of redeeming adults. If so, and to the extent we still 
seek separate and less punitive treatment for juvenile offenders, 
other-and more persuasive-grounds must be found on which to 
base such separation. But the rationale supporting that must begin by 
acknowledging that neither the doctrinal elements of the criminal law 
nor the redemptive rationale for imposing punishment erect struc-
tural bars to convicting and punishing children for crime. 
